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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Michael I. Swygert*
The dynamic reform movement in the consumer protection area, spear-
headed by consumer advocates and aided by new-found consumer aware-
ness, has culminated this year in significant judicial and legislative develop-
ments affecting rights and obligations of consumers. Professor Swygert
describes this consumer revolution through an analysis of the recent repos-
session cases, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act, and Truth-
in-Lending developments. Professor Swygert provides a tool with which
to study the response of Congress and the courts to these complex forces.
In addition, he maps the operation of the Pro Se Branch of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, and discusses Illinois' recent replevin amendments.
Underlying the discussion of these developments is a continuing inquiry:
are these measures effective, or are they merely a consumer palliative?
INTRODUCTION
URING this past year there have been many significant devel-
opments in the law affecting rights and obligations of con-
sumers. This article will discuss several of those developments.
Part One analyzes the important ruling of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which overturned a lower federal
court decision which had declared self-help repossession without a
hearing under California's UCC section 9-503 to constitute depriva-
tion of a consumer's rights to the use and enjoyment of property with-
out due process of law. The Supreme Court now has an opportunity
to decide this issue.
Part Two is an assessment of the Pro Se Branch of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, which has been in operation for only eighteen
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
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students Pamela Platt, Michael Dahlen, George Drake, Susan E. Loggans and
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months. On the basis of an in-depth survey and assessment, several
recommendations are made to increase the pro se court's accessability
for the many citizens who presently are foreclosed from its use due to
cultural and other factors.
Part Three comments on the recently passed Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-FTC Improvement Act which is still awaiting action in the
United States House of Representatives. The Act, unfortunately,
does nothing to destroy the myth that freedom of contract is opera-
tive in the consumer realm, yet does grant significantly greater en-
forcement powers to the Federal Trade Commission.
Part Four turns to a few recent developments relating to Truth-
in-Lending disclosure requirements under Regulation Z of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act.
Part Five comments on the revised Illinois replevin statute enacted
in response to the Supreme Court ruling of Fuentes v. Shevin.
Part Six discusses a proposed Federal Trade Commission Decep-
tive Practice Rule applicable to credit card and "related creditor"
sales to consumers. The proposed rule would limit the operation of
waiver-of-defense clauses even further than UNICO v. Owen and the
close-connection doctrine in consumer credit transactions.
Finally, Part Seven briefly discusses confessions of judgment,
the Federal Product Safety Act, product liability, and amendments
to Illinois statutes affecting a consumer's recission rights, and decep-
tive practices related to automotive repairs. The article concludes
by making some observations about broad movements in consumer-
ism during this past year.
PART ONE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SELF-HELP REPOSSESSIONS
UNDER UCC 9-305
In an eagerly awaited decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit on October 4, 1973 upheld the constitutionality
of self-help repossession and subsequent sale of collateral authorized
by sections 9-503' and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code.2
1. § 9-503. Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
1973]
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In so doing, the Ninth Circuit overturned the Adams v. Egley de-
cision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California which, in 1972, had held that self-help repossession of
collateral and subsequent sale are acts taken "under color of state
law" and therefore involve significant "state action" so that proce-
dural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution become applicable and actionable.4
In the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Adams v. Southern California
First Nat'l Bank, the three-judge panel in its two-to-one decision
articulated the issue as whether "prejudgment self-help repossession
of secured property, as provided for in the security agreements be-
tween the creditors and the debtors and as authorized under sections
9-503 and 9-504 of the California Commercial Code, involves suffi-
cient state action to establish a federal cause of action"5 brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
Jurisdictionally, the plaintiffs had to allege an invasion of their
rights taken "under the color of state law" to come to court. As
the Ninth Circuit pointed out, citing the Civil Rights Cases,' if the
repossession was "not state action but only an individual invasion
of individual rights, then the remedy is not the subject of the Four-
teenth Amendment."7  However, before setting out the Ninth Cir-
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it
available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties ...
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
2. UCC Section 9-504 permits the secured party to sell the collateral and apply
the proceeds to the debtor's outstanding indebtedness provided the sale or fore-
closure is done in a commercially reasonable manner.
3. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, - F.2d - (9th
Cir. 1973), also reported at CCH SECURED TRANSACTION S GUIDE 52,216.
4. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1973),
CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,216, rev'g Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), and aIf'g Hampton v. Bank of California, No. 72-1888 (ap-
peal docket), (ND. Cal. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Adams v. Southern California]. :
5. Adams v. Southern California, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUtIE 52,216,
at 67,308.
6. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
7. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities. of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
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cuit's reasoning, it is necessary to review the facts and articulate
the wider interests at stake.
The opinion was the consolidation of two earlier cases. In the
first, plaintiff Adams, a San Diego resident, in need of money to pay
medical bills, borrowed $1,000 from a local bank, and executed
chattel paper creating an Article Nine security interest in specific
collateral to secure the loan's repayment. The collateral consisted of
three used Volkswagens.
For over two years after obtaining the loan, Adams was able to
meet all payments. Subsequently, he became unemployed and fell
behind in making his payments. At the date of his unemployment,
Adams had repayed nearly $900 of the original $1,000 loan. After
his subsequent default, however, the bank decided to take possession
of the vehicles. Adams' outstanding indebtedness at the date of the
decision to take possession amounted to $217.45.
Only two days after making its decision to foreclose, the bank re-
possessed two of the motor vehicles in which it had a perfected secu-
rity interest. Subsequently, the vehicles were sold by the bank for a
net recovery of $219. At the time of the resale, Adams' outstand-
ing indebtedness was $220. The $1 deficiency was cancelled by
the secured party. The net result was that Adams lost his auto-
mobiles in addition to having paid over $900 for a $1,000 loan.
In the second case, consolidated for appeal with Adams, the
plaintiff Hampton had purchased a used Buick from a dealer, and
had executed a retail installment sales contract which the dealer
then assigned (probably for a discount) to the Bank of California.
The chattel paper called for 30 monthly payments of $118.30 each.
After having paid over $2,600 (or 22 monthly installments), Hamp-
ton was late in making his 23rd payment. Hampton claimed the
bank agreed he could make it up at a later time as long as he kept
current on the rest of his payments. The bank disagreed with this
claim. He tendered the next month's (24th) installment which the
bank returned. Shortly thereafter, the bank foreclosed and took
possession of the Buick, and notified Hampton it would sell the
car unless he paid the entire outstanding balance due under the accele-
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNst.,amend. XIV,-§ 1.
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ration clause plus collection charges, totalling nearly $950. Hampton
then filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of summary
self-help repossession without prior judicial hearing. This class ac-
tion was subsequently dismissed by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, claiming it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The facts in the two consolidated cases squarely raise the issue as
to how far the federal courts are willing to go in interpreting the
state-action concept as to a class of consumers, especially in light of
the related Supreme Court decisions of Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.," and Fuentes v. Shevin.9
In 1972, the Adams v. Egley federal district court opinion, written
by Judge Leland Nielsen, concluded that California's enactment of
section 9-503 was a state validation of private acts of repossession,
and that any recitations in security agreements as to a secured party's
repossession rights following a debtor's default flowed out of the
state validation, and did not, therefore, rest solely on the private
agreement of the parties.'0 Adams was the first due process repos-
session case decided under section 9-503. The floodgates then open-
ed. Within nine months of the Adams decision, eight reported and
two unreported decisions on the same point were issued. The courts
going against Adams and finding insufficient state action included
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California,1
a New Jersey superior court,' 2 a federal district court in Colorado," s
and the Superior Court for Santa Clara County, California.'4 At
the time of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in October 1973, the "box
8. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
9. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
10. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). The court cited
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) in which the Supreme Court held that a
California constitutional provision adopted in a state-wide referendum significantly
involved the state in racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. The
state constitutional provision standing by itself was held to constitute significant state
involvement in sanctioning discriminatory private conduct. It was upon this rea-
soning that the Adams v. Egley decision was built.
11. Hampton v. Bank of California, No. 72-1888 (appeal docket) (N.D. Cal.
1972).
12. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
13. Kirksey v. Thelig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972).
14. Kipp v. Cozens, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 1067 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1972).
[Vol. 23:98
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score" was nine against a finding of state action in pre-judgment,
9-503 repossessions; three courts finding the requisite state action,
and several decisions pending. In Illinois one such case is Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Gillaspie, an appeal argued and waiting decision at
the time of this writing, in the First District Illinois Appellate
Court.'" In addition, other recent cases on this issue have been de-
cided, some finding the requisite state action and others not finding
state action. 16
In October 1973, the Ninth Circuit's eagerly awaited decision was
rendered. The news was good to the board rooms, but disappoint-
ing to some, although not all, consumer advocates. The repossession
issue-the right of a secured party to strike without warning, with-
out even an opportunity for a hearing-is not as simple an issue as
a few have claimed. The broad social and economic issues are mul-
tifaceted and, as suggested in an extraordinary amicus brief filed in
behalf of the UCC Permanent Editorial Committee by Professor
Soia Mentschikoff, 17 the economic issues, the commercial interests,
indeed, the social ramifications transcend the mechanistic state ac-
tion analysis to which most legal commentators, and in particular
the Ninth Circuit, have confined their discussions.' 8
In the explosion of published commentaries on Adams v. Egley,'9
Fuentes v. Shevin,20 and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 one
15. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Gillaspie, Gen. No. 58307 (Appellate Ct., 1st
Dist., 3rd Div., Ill. 1972).
16. Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972) (up-
holding 9-503); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 627 (N.Y.
Cir. 1972) (invalidating 9-503); Gibbs v. Titelman, - F. Supp. - (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(also invalidating 9-503); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal.
1972); (9-503 does not amount to state action); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank,
322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (upholding 9-503).
17. Brief for the PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE as Amicus Curiae, prepared by Professor Soia Mentschikoff, including an un-
published appendix by Dr. Robert Johnson of Purdue University titled: Denial of
Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief].
18. A notable exception is William B. Davenport of the Chicago Bar who has
discussed the constitutional issues in the context of a secured party's desire "to
minimize realization expenses." Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies
Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 265
(1973). See also Fein, Yes, a Secured Party May Still Repossess Personal Property
in Illinois, 54 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 110 (1972).
19. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
20. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
21. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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rarely finds an attempt to identify meaningfully all of the interests
affected by a decision on the repossession issue, combined with a
choice of preferred interests to serve as a priority framework when
the interests collide. What follows will be an attempt to list various
consumer interests which are significantly affected by any decision
on self-help, summary repossessions.
From the consumer-debtor's perspective, surely the consumer's
dependence on the collateral for his or her well-being is significant.22
An automobile to drive to one's employment, absent available al-
ternative transportation, is simply a necessity, whereas a fully auto-
matic, 42-key electric organ for most people is a luxury. Should all
collateral be viewed equally? Do all forms and species of collateral
deserve equal protection of the laws?
Secondly, the consumer's hardship resulting from being deprived
of one's property (closely related to the first interest above) as
weighed against the reasonable possibility of meeting deferred obli-
gations-a concept of cure23 --is significant not only from the con-
sumer's interest of economic necessity but also from a commercial
perspective in saving transactions whenever possible, in maintaining
good will, and in opting for order versus disruption, which reposses-
sion represents.
Thirdly, the consumer's reason for defaulting may be a lawful ver-
sus economic one, for example, the merchant-creditor's dishonoring
of a warrant. In such cases the consumer should have the oppor-
tunity to assert this status before, rather than after being dispossess-
ed.2
4
Fourth, the consumer in a repossession situation is often put into
a state of emotional agitation, potentially harmful to himself and to
22. See Justice Douglas' language in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1967), where he discusses wages as a special species of property, noting
that the freezing of wages before judgment works an extreme hardship on the poor.
23. The concept of cure is old in commercial transactions, especially in sales.
See, e.g., UCC § 2-614 (substituted performance); UCC § 2-611 (retraction of
anticipatory repudiation); and especially UCC § 2-508 (cure by seller of improper
tender).
24. The root defect with pre-judgment takings of one's property is that it re-
verses the traditional and reasonable notion that one is innocent until proven
guilty (or liable) when remedies will then first lie absent extraordinary circum-
stances. In self-help repossessions, on the sole word of the creditor, a debtor's in-
terest in his property is cut off. The burden to litigate the issue then falls on the
consumer, the party with the least resources, and least knowledge regarding the in-
stitution of legal actions.
104 [Vol. 23:98
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his community.2 The consumer has been repeatedly told that in a
government of laws, no one can take the law into his or her own
hands. To the consumer a repossessor appears to be doing just that.
To recapitulate, the interests of a consumer affected by a non-judi-
cial repossession can be varied. They can range from the definite
impact on fourteenth amendment rights, through obvious economic
hardships imposed, to the prospect of inflicting emotional distress.
These are not, however, the only consumer interests involved. Un-
der the principle of stare decisis, it is important to look at the in-
terests of all consumers; not just the individual consumer plaintiff.
It is in this larger focus that the fog can begin to obscure the con-
sumer's clear arguments demanding procedural due process, sub-
stantial justice and fair play. The fog rolls in when one is told to
consider only the possible impacts on consumer financing resulting
from a judicial pronouncement that there must be notice, followed
by a judicial hearing in which there is an opportunity to raise de-
fenses or to seek a more equitable settlement than the one-sided dras-
tic repossession-foreclosure--deficiency judgment course desired by
the secured party.2"
Here Soia Mentschikoff and others "go to town." The beauty of
repossessions, they say, is that there are so few; that the few are fast;
that the value of the collateral between default-repossession and
sale falls far less than would surely occur in the protracted default-
notice-hearing-replevin and sale route: that, since collateral such
as motor vehicles depreciate so rapidly, that, even with good-in-
tentioned, well expedited court procedures, the inevitable delays
would seriously limit the value of motor vehicles as collateral; that
such low prospects of repossession would mean that lenders would
either require higher collateral-to-loan ratios when extending credit,
25. To be sure, UCC § 9-503 demands that self-help repossessions be done
"without breach of the peace." The tests are many. But if a creditor has retained a
key for a motor vehicle in which the creditor has a security interest and the debtor
defaults on the underlying obligation, and if the car is in the debtor's driveway or
on a public street, the debtor's verbal protests generally will not be deemed
sufficient to make the creditor's taking a breach of the peace.
26. The creditor's non-judicial course of action extends to the filing of a de-
ficiency action, permitted in certain circumstances under UCC § 9-504. It is a
self-help course of action, free of judicial supervision and control. Although the
private foreclosure is to be done in a commercially reasonable manner one cannot
be certain that it is, absent the commencing of a law suit against the secured party.
19731
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or it would mean higher interest charges to cover the added costs
caused by delay, and by attorney and court fees, or it might even re-
sult-if higher marginal repossession costs exceed marginal higher
interest revenues-in drying up consumer loans for automobile pur-
chases.
Note that in any of the above circumstances, the consumer loses-
the consumer must either put up more collateral (often an economic
impossibility), pay considerably higher finance charges, or go with-
out. The basic theory asserted is that consumer protection is
predicated on a competitive, free market.27 Following this logic,
the argument concludes that the most anti-consumer protection action
would be to outlaw self-help summary repossessions. Indeed, con-
sumers "as a class" will be worse off. In short, it is the old "class"
versus "individual" argument. Our laws are in certain constructs,
such as repossession, utilitarian-premised after all.
The argument that to disturb in any way the existing creditor-
debtor relationship will tip the scales to dry-up credit heretofore
available fails because it logically cannot be proven. At best, the
effect is speculative. Yet, this limiting-of-credit theme is repeated
so often that it has become the "national security" refrain of the
credit industry. In addition to being unproveable conjecture, the argu-
ment assumes that there could be no positive public "benefit" result-
ing from limiting credit availability from the virtual no-limitations-re-
gardless-of-economic-condition type of consumer credit.
So the first of the major anti-Adams v. Egley policy arguments
is tendered as pro-consumer "class" justification for summary repos-
sesssion versus prior notice and hearing self-help repossession.
A second major policy argument in favor of nonjudicial self-help
may be described as the "clout" theory. Soia Mentschikoff, in her
brief, underscored the relative paucity of repossessions versus the
number of secured transactions terminating without the necessity for
the self-help remedy.2" The reason for so few actual repossessions, so
it is claimed, is due to the "threat" of repossession. Indeed, the
27. The "free market theory" is supportive of consumer protection, but the ques-
tions are to what extent are consumer markets truly competitive and to what
extend does there exist the requisite consumer choice?
28. Amicus Brief, supra note 17.
(Vol. 23:98
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"evil of the dishonest debtor who 'skips' would be increased," so the
amicus brief states. More careful scrutiny in credit extensions, how-
ever, would obviate this possibility.
The final argument for the credit industry, especially automobile
financers, who in 1972 held over $40 billion dollars of credit out-
standing, forcefully raised in the Amicus Brief can be called "we-
got-you-over-the-barrel-anyway" theory. It is really that simple.
Indeed, to quote from this extraordinary brief, Professor Ment-
schikoff writes that the number of cases in which a debtor dealing
with a secured party would have a defense "is infinitesimal in view
of the limitation of remedies involved in the sale of new cars and
the limited warranties which are customary for used cars."'29  In-
credible, when you think about it. The Uniform Commerical Code
validates limitations of remedies,30 validates full disclaimer of war-
ranty liability,3' and permits freedom of contract. 32  What more
could a dealer-financer desire?
The fact that the UCC is pro-banking, pro-merchant (vis-a-vis
the consumer) comes as no particular surprise. But to build an argu-
ment that the Code has the consumer buyer over a barrel because it
validates a merchant's or finance company's freedom of contract
and not mention adhesion or unconscionability as counter-weights,
and to conclude that any hearing prior to repossession would be
meaningless is in reality saying the consumer has few, if any, rights
at all. Judges might not be as easily convinced of the wisdom of
the barrel argument in such a straightforward form.
The automobile buyer today generally has no right to withhold
payments as leverage due to the disclaimer clauses, assignment
clauses, waiver-of-defense provisions, and the limitation of remedy
provisions typically contained in the retail installment contract, which
must be executed if he desires to make the purchase. Truly, the
freedom of contract in the consumer setting is a myth.
The issue discussed by the Ninth Circuit was considerably less
broad-is there significant state action in repossessions under UCC
section 9-503? This clearly presents an issue one can brief, argue,
29. Id. at 13.
30. See UCC §§ 2-316(1), (2) and (3).
31. See UCC § 2-316(4).
32. See, e.g., UCC § 9-501(3).
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and decide by never going outside Supreme Court opinions. That
constitutes a lawyer's issue. The Amicus brief was extraordinary,
even though it may confuse many lawyers. It raised the issues of
decisional impact, of the interests of the credit industry, indeed, of
expediency, of paternalism, of commercial pragmatics. The brief
raised the overall anti-consumer bias of the UCC. Although this
writer disagrees with the arguments proffered in the brief, he is
nonetheless pleased that they were raised.
In the narrower decisional construct, the Ninth Circuit held that
the State of California was not "so significantly involved" in self-
help repossession so as to constitute action taken under color of law.3"
In using the Supreme Court's "significantly involved" test for state
action set forth in Moose Lodge, 4 the Ninth Circuit noted that the
test as applied in equal protection contexts does not necessarily apply
to due process, but went on to apply the test anyway.
"The test," the court stated, "is not state involvement, but rather
is significant state involvement." 5  That this qualification may beg
the question was not recognized. For if the court is saying that it
is a qualitative versus a quantitative standard, how are such param-
eters distinguished? Quantity is in this instance a qualitative fac-
tor. It reminds us of the confusion in conflicts law which developed
when the courts went to the "center of gravity," or "grouping of
contacts" formula for determining choice of law. More confusion is
created than eliminated by amorphous standards which result from
adjectives such as "significant." Such standards place the legal com-
munity in a veritable maze. "Significant" must be measured by
impact. The Ninth Circuit, however, ignored this path since it
pointed to the "practical consideration that a great deal of human
behavior conforms to state law." 8 The court added that by "merely
putting into statutory form existing private remedies," the state did
not conclusively and significantly involve itself in the repossessions.
The court concluded that there were no direct benefits to the state
as a result of the repossessions, that consequently, there did not
33. Adams v. Southern California, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,216,
at 67,309.
34. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
35. Adams v. Southern California, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,216,
at 67,310.
36. Id. at 67,312.
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exist the symbiotic relationship which had been present in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority.3"
Even the more nominalistic basis for a finding of significant in-
volvement-the existence of an extensive system of state regulation
-was rejected by the Ninth Circuit though done with more diffi-
culty in view of the recent wave of private utility service termination
cases.
3 8
In response to the plaintiffs' contention that the repossessors were
"clothed under color of state law," the court distinguished the Sup-
reme Court case of Williams v. United States,3 9 by noting that the
private detective in Williams held and used a special Police Officer's
card issued by the City of Miami, and that no comparable badge of
authority was involved in the repossession context. Finally, men-
tioning Fuentes" in one brief paragraph, the majority simply stated
that there was no question about state action in that pre-judgment
replevin context. 1
Consequently, the majority reversed Adams v. Egley and affirmed
Hampton v. Bank of California. However, the issue is not yet set-
tled. The Supreme Court of the United States undoubtedly will be
called on to speak. In support of the probability of the Court's
granting certiorari is the dissenting opinion in Adams by Judge
William M. Byrne.42
Judge Byrne would read the case of Reitman v. Mulkey43 as con-
trolling as did the district judge in Adams v. Egley.44 In noting that
even the creditor conceded a violation of due process by deprivation
of property without any hearing provided there is the requisite state
action, Judge Byrne aptly points out that California deliberately
chose to follow a state policy of encouraging repossession and sales
without a judicial hearing which the state embodied in sections 9-503
37. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
38. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
Contra, Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
39. 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
40. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
41. Adams v. Southern California, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,216,
at 67,316.
42. Id.
43. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
44. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:98
and 9-504.45 He then concluded that the state, by encouraging re-
possessions and sales, by formulating and authoritatively rendering a
policy choice, "became significantly involved within the meaning of
Reitman v. Mulkey."46  Judge Byrne struck the mark squarely.
The state did act, did involve itself significantly because the impact
(unconstitutional private conduct) was significant. As Michael
Spak stated in a recent article:
There is a persuasive analogy between the Reitman case and the case of
an ordinary automobile repossession. In Reitman, a state constitutional
amendment was found to be state action because its effect caused outright
involvement of the state in the encouragement of discrimination. Similarly,
in a repossession case, the secured creditor repossesses the auto without
due process under the authority of section 9-503 of the UCC: In both
cases the state's enactment has encouraged individuals to commit acts that
they may have refrained from doing in the absence of a statute authorizing
their actions. It is reasonable to believe that one would hesitate to break
into another's car unless he knew both that he had a statutory right to do so
and that such a right would shield him from arrest as a car thief.47
State encouragement of conduct which otherwise would not likely
have taken place, conduct which causes private hardships, certainly
is significant involvement, for what more involves state action than
sanctions which motivate and protect private action? Shelley v.
Kraemer48 lives!
PART TWO
ASSESSMENT OF THE PRO SE COURT
OF COOK COUNTY
The Special Pro Se Branch of the Small Claims Division of the
Circuit Court of Cook County was established May 15, 1972, by an
order issued by the Honorable Eugene L. Wachowski, presiding
judge of the first municipal district.49 The creation of the pro se
45. See notes 1 and 2, supra.
46. Adams v. Southern California, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE f 52,216,
at 67,317.
47. Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors Under
Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 855 (1973).
48. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
49. "EFFECTIVE MAY 15, 1972, there shall be established a Special Pro Se
Branch of the Small Claims Court in the First Municipal District of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, in Room 1307, Chicago Civic Center, at 3:00 P.M. each
day, until further order of the Court .... ." GENERAL ORDER No. 72-8, Circuit
110
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court (as it is commonly called) was supported by many Chicago
jurists and attorneys. Although many persons deserve recognition
for supporting the principle of a consumers' forum, most credit goes
to members of the Young Lawyers Section of the Chicago Bar
Association who made the realization of a pro se court in Chicago
a cause celebre. °
Unlike many other small claims forums, the pro se branch was set
up to assure that the court would not be turned into a corporate col-
lections court. This corporate foreclosure is achieved in part
through Rule 4A which prohibits any plaintiff from filing more than
three actions within any twelve month period." Indeed, this rule is
illustrative of the historical justification for the establishment of small
claims courts: "[T]o provide for disposing quickly, inexpensively,
and justly of the litigation of the poor .... "52
Court of Cook County, Illinois, First Municipal District (May 1, 1972, Wachowski,
J.) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL ORDER].
50. On February 28, 1972. John J. Held, Jr. and Fredric B. Weinstein, members
of the Legal Assistance Committee of the Young Lawyers Sections of the Chicago
Bar Association submitted a written "Proposal for the Establishment of a Separate
Small Claims Division in the First Municipal District" to Judge Wachowski and
Judge Francis X. Poynton, of the Municipal Division of the First District. The
proposal was based on the results of a committee study on small claims courts
established in other large cities. The written proposal cited two earlier writings:
Robinson, A Small Claims Division for Chicago's New Circuit Court, 44 Cm. B.
REC. 421 (1963), and Fox, Small Claims Revisions-A Break for the Layman,
20 DEPAUL L. REV. 912 (1971).
The Young Lawyers Section proposal won the support of the Honorable John S.
Boyle, Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Cook County. The May 1, 1972 enabling
order issued by Judge Wachowski included the following language based partly on
the data set out in the Young Lawyers written proposal:
A study of Small Claims Courts indicates that many individuals (as
opposed to corporations, partnerships and associations) oftentimes cannot
economically justify the employment of an attorney, either to prosecute
a small claim (as defined herein, a claim of $300 or less) or to present a
meritorious defense. The establishment of a pro se Small Claims Court
with the sole object of providing substantial justice between the parties will
offer a forum wherein individuals can obtain a prompt and a relatively in-
expensive hearing and adjudication of their small claim.
GENERAL ORDER.
51. No Plaintiff is allowed to file more than three actions in the Special
Pro Se Branch within a 12 month period.
The complaint shall be accompanied by the affidavit of the plaintiff
verifying that he has not filed more than three complaints during the cal-
endar year.
GENERAL ORDER Rule 4(A).
52. R. PoUrNo, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 260 (1940). For an excellent dis-
cussion of how the small claims forum development failed to achieve its laudable
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In spite of this laudable purpose, the history of small claim ad-
judication has generally been unsatisfying. The most frequent crit-
icism is that small claim adjudication becomes essentially a collec-
tion forum." In addition, appeals are, as a practical matter, not
available to small claim litigants.5" An extensive recent survey of
small claims courts has been published by one of Ralph Nader's study
groups. The study concludes that small claim adjudication has gen-
erally been a great disappointment.55
Has the Cook County pro se branch within its short period of
existence (approximately 18 months) fulfilled its purpose as en-
visioned by its proponents? Indeed, has the pro se court realized
its stated objective of providing "substantial justice" in a forum where
"individuals can obtain a prompt and relatively inexpensive hearing
and adjudication of their small claim."58
To attempt to answer these questions, several DePaul University
College of Law students observed the pro se court in session and
examined its public court files. 57  The period of in-session obser-
vations covered approximately twelve weeks during the winter and
early spring of 1973. The student-observers kept detailed logs of
what they witnessed and their recorded data was subsequently as-
sembled and evaluated.
Overall, the assembled data serves to indicate the variety of com-
plaints filed, the categories of plaintiffs, the categories of defendants,
the procedural dispositions, the satisfaction of judgment problems, as
well as the sex, age and race of plaintiffs."" Unfortunately, no statis-
purpose, see Fox, Small Claim Revisions-A Break for the Layman, 20 DEPAUL
L. REV. 912 (1971).
53. Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Per-
formed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657 (1969);
Comment, Small Claims Courts and the Poor, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (1969);
Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts From High Risk Credit Buyers
in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 879 (1967); Note, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 237 (1952).
54. See D. ROTHSCHILD AND T. CARROL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING
SERVICE 672 (1973).
55. SMALL CLAIMS STUDY GROUP, LITTLE INJUSTICES: SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
AND THE AMERICAN CONSUMER (M. Green ed. 1972).
56. GENERAL ORDER.
57. The students were Philip Krasny, William J. Haddad, David A. Schlack,
Elaine Steed, and Demetrius Edward Carney.
58. Mr. William Haddad, a senior law student in the DePaul University College
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tics were compiled as to the residence of the plaintiffs either within
Chicago's neighborhoods or within Cook County at large.59
In practice, plaintiffs begin their pro se experience by being in-
terviewed by a law clerk connected with the pro se branch. One
such employee-clerk, Donald Spak, a senior DePaul law student, ex-
plained that this initial screening interview is crucial since it serves
two critical functions. First, the screening interview permits the law
clerk to attempt to dissuade filings where, in the law clerk's judg-
ment, there is no legal basis for the complaint alleged by the poten-
tial plaintiff. Mr. Spak emphasizes that he never refuses to assist
in the drafting of a pro se complaint, but does suggest to certain per-
sons that their chances for success are minimal, for example, when
objectionable conduct is not legally actionable.
The second function of the law clerk's pre-filing interview is to
provide expertise in drafting the complaint which requires the liti-
gant to succinctly state the legal basis for the action. This is particu-
larly helpful to both the trial judge and the defendants. So in
reality, the pro se branch is really quasi-pro se, since assistance in
reviewing complaints and in drafting the initial pleading is furnished
by the court through employee and volunteer law clerks. In the
DePaul study of the pro se branch, there were no statistics compiled
as to the number of potential litigants dissuaded from filing as a re-
sult of these initial law clerk interviews.
Although the pro se court's rules limit actions filed to claims for
$300 or less, 0 the average claim filed during the period of observa-
tion amounted to $195. As to the categories of claims filed, the
largest number involved consumer complaints arising out of sales
and service transactions.6" In fact, of all the complaints filed, 38 per-
of Law, completed the statistical compilation and assisted the author in the subse-
quent analysis.
59. This oversight is being corrected where possible by a review of court files.
60. Rule 1 specifies that a small claim means "any claim which does not exceed
$300, exclusive of costs." GENERAL ORDER Rule 1.
61. Sales transactions in the context of this pro se study include sales for per-
sonal, household or family use whether for cash or on credit. Service transactions,
however, include not only alleged breaches of warranty by merchants, but also dis-
putes arising from any service situation in which one party is an individual and in
which transaction the service is to be performed for a personal, family or household
benefit. Consequently, service transactions include disputes arising out of product-
repair service contexts and also controversies originating in professional service
contexts, for example, medical, legal, or dental services.
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cent fell within this consumer complaint category. This 38 percent
figure can be further broken down into: complaints filed by con-
sumers under retail installment or other sales contracts, 15 percent of
all complaints filed; complaints filed by consumers against mer-
chants, professional people and others involving disputes as to ser-
vices other than chattel repairs, also 15 percent of all complaints
filed; and complaints filed by consumers involving disputes over
chattel repairs (for example, breach of warranty claims, negligence
or breach of contract repairs, etc.), 8 percent of all complaints filed.
Given the stated objective of institutionalizing a forum for the ad-
judication of consumer small claims, the above figures justify the
existence of the pro se court.
An analysis of the remaining 62 percent also supports the conclu-
sion that the pro se branch is fulfilling its purpose. Of the com-
plaints filed, 16 percent were by individuals seeking recovery of
security deposits under lease arrangements; 17 percent were for
damages sustained to property resulting from automobile or other
vehicular collisions; 2 percent involved claims for personal injuries;
while 4 percent were for non-payment of wages due; 9 percent in-
volved non-merchant private disputes, for example, controversies
over loans, stop payment orders and personal notes; and 3 percent
involved claims for damages to real property.
On the other hand, 3 percent of all complaints filed set out
claims by merchants against consumers for money owed, while
only 2 percent involved counter-claims by banks, finance companies,
and service personnel for money due. Approximately 5 percent of
the claims were classified by the observers as miscellaneous. For
example, there were some bailment disputes and encroachment dis-
putes, neither of which were frequent enought to consider as a sep-
arate category.62  Clearly, consumers with small claims have been
62. Placing the figures in a table reveals the magnitude of the consumer claim
as the dominant action filed. Indeed, the following table illustrates that individual
complaints filed by consumers and tenants against merchants and landlords typify
the subject matter controversies heard during an average afternoon in the pro se
court. SUBJECT MATTER
OF COMPLAINTS FILED
1. Suits For Property (no personal-injury claims)
Damages Resulting from Vehicular Collisions 17%
2. Suits For Recovery of Security Deposits
and/or Rental Payments 16%
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using the new adjudicatory machinery available in Cook County,
Illinois. However, the drafting and filing of a complaint and the
payment of necessary fees6 3 are only the first steps in any judicial
proceeding. To assess the success of the plaintiffs in recovering un-
der their claims, we now focus on the manner and variety of disposi-
tions in the pro se court.
A plaintiff's initial court contact, that is, his appearance before a
judge, usually comes about 62 days after filing the pro se com-
plaint.64 The court hearing assumes the successful service of the
complaint and summons. The assembled data reveals, however,
that in 13 percent of all cases filed, service was never accomplished.
In those instances lacking in personam jurisdiction over the defen-
dants, the court had no choice but to dismiss the action. On the
other hand, service by a first certified mailing was accomplished in
56 percent of all services attempted and was successful in 4 percent
of the cases of a second certified mailing, while 27 percent of all ser-
vices attempted were successfully performed by the county sheriff.
Consequently, in no more than one out of ten actions were the
claims dismissed for failure of service. As to the majority of ac-
3. Consumer Complaints Arising Out of Sales Contracts 15%
4. Consumer Complaints Arising Out of Service
(non-repair) Contexts 15%
5. Private Disputes Over Money Owed (e.g., loans,
notes, checks) Where Neither Litigant is a
Merchant or Financial Party 9%
6. Consumer Complaints Arising out of Repair Contexts
(e.g., automobile repairs and/or servicing) 8%
7. Suits For Wages Earned and Withheld 4%
8. Suits For Damages to Real Property 3%
9. Suits by Merchants Against Consumers or Purchasers 3%
10. Suits For Payment of Services 2%
11. Suits For Personal Injuries 2%
12. Suits for Rents Due 1%
13. Miscellaneous 5%
TOTAL 100%
63. The cost of filing a pro se complaint in room 602 of the Chicago Civic
Center is $8.00. Service by mail costs an additional $1.50, while service by the
Sheriff of Cook County will cost an additional $6.00 fee, plus 16 cents a mile from
the Civic Center. For persons unable to pay the filing and service fees, they may
go to Room 1301 in the Civic Center and appear before a judge and request pauper
status.
64. The defendant is required to go to room 602 in the Civic Center on the
"Return Date" specified in the summons which day will be at least 28 days but no
more than 40 days after the date of filing. The trial is scheduled for two weeks
after the return date in room 1307 at 3:00 P.M.
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tions not dismissed at this early stage, their dispositions may be sum-
marized as follows: ex parte default judgments not subsequently va-
cated by the court, 22 percent of all actions filed; ex parte default
judgments subsequently vacated with other dispositions, for example,
dismissal by the court and dismissal by party stipulation, 14 percent
of all actions filed; dismissal for want of prosecution, a surprisingly
small 7 percent; involuntary dismissal by the court, 5 percent; dis-
missal by stipulation of the parties (often following a court suggested
"compromise"), 18 percent; judgment entered for the plaintiff, 11
percent; and judgment entered for the defendant, 10 percent.
It should be stressed that even though substantial files were checked
by the record searching group and numerous procedures observed
by the investigating team of law students, any eleven week period is
still a relatively short span of time to collect data which will reliably
typify long-term situations. But it also should be stated that during
the period of examination, the above figures do produce an exact
dispositive profile of the pro se court.
To recapitulate, procedural dispositions in the pro se court break
down as follows:
(1) No service, 13%;
(2) Ex Parte defaults not vacated, 22%;
(3) Ex Parte vacated, 14%;
(4) Involuntary dismissals, 5%;
(5) Dismissals for want of prosecution, 7 %;
(6) Stipulations of dismissal, 18%;
(7) Plaintiffs' judgments, 11%; and
(8) Defendant judgments, 10%.
It would, of course, be erroneous to conclude from these figures
that a plaintiff "succeeds" in only 11 percent of all cases filed. First,
there is a high number of default judgments which are later vacated
and which, therefore, can subsequently serve as the basis for bank
garnishment or wage deduction actions against assets of the default-
judgment debtor.65
65. The investigation of the pro se court did not include the critical determina-
tion of the success or lack of success of plaintiff in ultimately obtaining satisfaction
for judgments entered.
One of the problems with small claims, pro se proceedings is that litigants
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Second, there is a relatively high number of in-court settlements.
Nearly 20 percent of all actions filed and 33 percent of all "trials,"
culminate in the parties stipulating dismissals. These often result
from the court suggested "compromise," which the students in at-
tendance concluded to be one of the noteworthy features of the pro
se branch. Given that the inital joint appearance of the defendant
and the plaintiff before the court typically will serve as a preliminary
hearing, pre-trial conference, and trial all wrapped into one expedited
proceeding, it is to be expected that court prompting of non-judgment
accords takes place.
Third, it is likely but not data-provable that in a significant num-
ber of actions dismissed for want of prosecution, the defendant fol-
lowing receipt of service reached an out-of-court settlement or ac-
cord with the plaintiff.
Thus, on the basis of this statistical assessment, plaintiffs, as a
class, appear to be reasonably successful in obtaining either judg-
ments or partial satisfactions through court and out-of-court settle-
ments. Of course, this assessment is predicated only on quantita-
tive procedural data. No attempt was made to make a qualitative
assessment of dispositions-for example, the percentage of moneys
recovered as against the total amount of damages pleaded.
Turning to the categories of plaintiffs and defendants, individuals
predominate over firms as plaintiffs-as anticipated under pro se
branch rule 4A. Firms, however, slightly outnumber individuals as
defendants.6"
often fail to understand the need for supplemental actions to collect payment of a
judgment. The "easiest" proceeding to initiate is a "citation" which is a court order
requiring a defendant to appear and to answer questions about the amount and
location of assets. Other supplemental proceedings available to a pro se plaintiff in
the Circuit Court of Cook County include wage deduction and garnishment
orders, the latter often directed to banks where the defendant maintains accounts.
66. CATEGORIES OF LITIGANTS
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
Individuals 98% 46%
Firms (counter-claimants) 2% 54%
The firms in the plaintiff column represent either counter-claimants or third-party
plaintiffs. The following table reveals that men outnumber women by a better than
two-to-one margin.




An attempt was made to ascertain if sex status was a factor in plaintiffs' success
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As to the race of the litigants, in-court observations recorded ap-
pearances by more white plaintiffs than black plaintiffs. Similarly,
more appearances by white defendants than blacks were observed.67
To be precise, 40 percent of the plaintiffs and 37 percent of the
defendants were blacks. Although these statistics may have little
probative weight, they, in addition to other data support the staff's
overall conclusions regarding the courts; to wit, that blacks within
Chicago either do not take advantage or do not have access to the
pro se branch to the same extent as do whites.
More specifically, a follow-up study by another group of DePaul
law students during the summer months of 1973, indicates that
Chicago residents generally are not aware of the pro se court's exist-
ence.68 Moreover, this level of unawareness is appreciably higher
within the predominantly black areas of the city.
This unawareness differential in part is explained by the fact that
the most extensive news feature about the pro se court appeared in
a Sunday edition of the Chicago Tribune which we assume has a de-
cidedly lower circulation among Chicago's blacks than among the
city's whites vis-a-vis the Chicago Sun-Times.69
The 1973 summer "pro se awareness study" disclosed that less
than one out of seven persons responding to the question, "Have
you heard of the pro se court?", had in fact heard of it prior to being
asked the question. The survey group found this figure surprising
since they had anticipated a much smaller positive response. Un-
fortunately, the sample was random with no scientific or methodo-
logical basis of selection. While the randomness does detract from
rate, or the rate of claims ending in partial or total recovery. The sample was too
small in light of the minor percentage difference (which favored the female plain-
tiff) to draw any conclusions given all the other variables (type of action, class of
defendant, presiding judge, etc.).
67. Again, an attempt was made to ascertain if there existed any clear linkage
between success rate and race of plaintiff. And again, the same conclusion was
reached; the sample was too small to draw any legitimate conclusions in view of
the multifarious variables that operate in the United States other than race.
. 68. This project conducted during the months of July and August, 1973, was
undertaken by five DePaul University College of Law students as part of a course
requirement in consumer protection law taught by the author.
69. The article, titled A New Court for the Little Guy, was written by Jack
Star and appeared in the January 21, 1973 edition of the Magazine Section of the
Sunday Chicago Tribune. According to personnel in the Civic Center connected
with the pro se branch, filings went up noticeably after the article's publication.
118 [Vol. 23:98
CONSUMER PROTECTION
the authoritative impact of the survey it is at least an indicator of
public awareness.
The students did, however, attempt a second approach to ascer-
tain the level of pro se court awareness, by drafting a questionnaire
and having it published in two predominantly black readership Chi-
cago newspapers: the Chicago Defender and the Independent Bulle-
tin.70
The readers were asked to fill out the questionnaire and mail it to
the DePaul University College of Law in Chicago. Not surprisingly,
only forty-one were returned. This figure represents an infinitesimally
small percentage of the total readership of the two papers. But the re-
sponses of this sample were virtually uniform, thirty-nine of the for-
ty-one respondents had not heard of the pro se court.
A third attempt, also non-scientific, at ascertaining citizen aware-
ness of the pro se court's existence and function was made by dis-
70. The questionnaire was published in August, 1973.
lished contained only eight questions. A sample follows:
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Have you ever heard of the Cook County
pro se Court where people may file a
claim for under $300 without a lawyer?
2. Do you know that in Cook County you can
sue to collect debts or recover damages
up to $300 without an attorney?
3. Do you believe that you may have a claim
for $300 or less against someone now?
4. If you answered question 3 "yes," would
you go to the Civic Center in downtown
Chicago and file your own clam with the
assistance of the pro se court staff?
5. Would you be more likely to file a claim
in the pro se court if the court was lo-
cated in your neighborhood?
6. Would you be willing to help get the pro
se type of court located in your neighbor-
hood?
7. Would you like to see this court opened in
the evenings and on Saturdays (currently
the Court is open from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00
p.m., Monday through Friday)?
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tributing copies of the drafted awareness questionnaire"1 to legal aid
societies in Chicago, asking the societies to have those people coming
into their offices fill them out. A total of sixty-five completed ques-
tionnaires eventually found their way back to DePaul. Again, the
figures indicated an overwhelming unawareness of the special pro se
court, sixty-two of the sixty-five respondents claiming they had never
heard of the court. Surprisingly, this response comes over one year
after the court's creation and after extensive Chicago area media
features on the pro se court.
Legal clinics in Chicago, such as the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic at
the University of Chicago, have attempted to inform the public of
the pro se forum by distributing informational sheets explaining
what the pro se court does and telling how and where to file a com-
plaint.72
71. An identical questionnaire to the one that was published in the newspapers
was distributed.
72. The one distributed by the Mandel Clinic follows:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING SMALL CLAIM COMPLAINT
Small claims court is set up for persons not represented by lawyers to
file claims for not more than $300. The cases are heard downtown in the
Chicago Civic Center at Randolph and Dearborn Streets at 3 p.m. in room
1307.
In order to file a suit you must file a complaint and have a summons
served on the opposing party. The total cost is $9.50. The suit is filed
in room 602 of the Chicago Civic Center. The procedure is as follows:
1. Preparing the Complaint
Fill in the blanks in the attached complaint. Make an original (for the
court) and two copies (one for you and one for the person you're suing).
Make sure that the complaint lists your name, address, and phone number
at the bottom. If your claim is based on something in writing (like a re-
ceipt or a contract), you should make three xerox copies and attach one
to each complaint. Keep the original for the trial. If you have any ques-
tions, ask the clerks in room 602 to help you.
2. Preparing the Summons
Fill in the blanks on the form summons. Make an original plus three
copies. One copy will be sent by certified mail to the defendant at the
address you list on it. It orders the defendant to appear in room 602 on a
certain date, which you have to fill in. Fill in the date when you file
the case for a day not less than 28 nor more than 40 days after you file
the case. Make sure it is on a week day.
3. Filing the Case
Take the completed forms to the Civic Center at Randolph and Dearborn
Streets downtown. Go to room 602 on the sixth floor and file the papers
with the cashier. The cashier will take your money and will put the case
number on all the papers you file. She will give you some of the papers
back for you to bring to court. If you have any questions, ask the clerks
in room 602.
The clerk will send a copy of the complaint and summons to the de-
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Given all the surveys together, the point seems inescapable that
even though consumers and other individuals are using the pro se
branch to litigate small claims, the potential usefulness of such a
forum has yet to be fully realized. This conclusion is underscored
by responses in the questionnaires to the question of whether the
respondent believed that he or she had an existing small claim against
an individual business. Of a total of 106 questionnaires completed
and returned, seventy-six marked "yes" in answer to that question.
Although the sample is small and random, the figures essentially
indicate the pervasive volume of minor wrongs routinely taking
place. In the past there has been no adequate or accessible legal
forum for minor conflict resolutions. Indeed, the answers to the
questionnaires contain a clear message: Thousands, perhaps tens of
thousands of persons in Chicago have been wronged in small ways.
As a consequence these people have been damaged but their claims
are not worth consideration by the vast majority of attorneys. More-
over, most of these small claim plaintiffs are unaware that there
fendant by certified mail. If the defendant accepts the certified mail, he
will be required to come to room 602 on the date you filled in on the
summons. This is called the return date. This is not the trial date. You
do not need to come to court then. The trial date will be two weeks later
in room 1307 of the Chicago Civic Center at 3:00 p.m.
Your case will be scheduled for trial only if the defendant gets the sum-
mons. To find out whether the defendant got the summons, go to room
602 within the two weeks following the return date. Ask the clerks to
show you the return day books. You can find out whether the defendant
got the summons and when the trial is scheduled by looking at these books.
In order to look up this information, you need to know your case name,
number, and return date.
4. Hearing
On the day set for the hearing (3:00 p.m. in room 1307 two weeks after
the defendant is first required to come to room 602), bring all your wit-
nesses with you, together with the complaint and any other papers you
have relating to the case (receipts, contracts, etc.). Get to court about ten
minutes early and check in with the clerk. When the case gets called, go
up to the judge with your witnesses. Show the judge your complaint, tell
him what your complaint is for, and introduce your witness, and then to
the testimony of the defendant. If the defendant wants a jury trial or
wants to be represented by a lawyer, the case will be transferred to an-
other court.
If you have any questions, or if the defendant wants a jury trial or to be
represented by an attorney, call me.
My name is
Our phone number is I am usually in the office
on from
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exists a judicial forum where they, without a lawyer, can pursue their
claim with a reasonable chance of successful recovery.7"
The analysis now turns to a related factor-the location of the pro
se branch, since many persons indicated on their questionnaire that
they desired the pro se branch to conduct hearings throughout the
city of Chicago. Presently, the special pro se branch sits in only one
location.
As part of the civil court structure of Cook County, the pro se
branch is located on the thirteenth floor of the Civic Center in the
heart of downtown Chicago. It should come as no surprise to the
legal establishment that as viewed by many of Chicago's citizens,
the "Loop" appears as foreign soil where predominantly rich, white,
middle-class suburbanites spend their days inside 100-story skyscrap-
ers.
To many of the economically and racially oppressed people of
the city, and to many of the non-English speaking people as well,
going to the thirteenth floor of the Civic Center is undoubtedly a
psychologically distressing undertaking.74 Not fully understanding
where they are going or what might happen to them, and surrounded
by a new and strange environment, they often enter the Civic Center
unsure, afraid, ready to turn and run at the first discourteous re-
mark.75 While being a bit dramatic such feelings are legitimate and
73. A distinction must be made between fostering litigation by making people
aware of forums for adjudicating legitimate claims, and encouraging litigation by
making people believe they have justiciable claims which will probably be success-
ful in litigation when, in fact, the law does not support such claims. The former
encouragement is within the highest traditions of the legal profession, while the
latter, if not actionable as an abuse of process, at least contributes to the further
politicizing of legal processes.
74. There are two "barriers to entry" to the pro se branch-lack of education
and emotional resistance. The educational void, that is, awareness of the court
and knowledge of how to invoke its forum for small claim resolution, can likely be
overcome by "walk-through" manuals. Emotional resistance is not so easily re-
moved as a barrier. Naturally, the existence of neighborhood branches of the pro se
court would decrease the emotional resistance of many people. The resistance to
going into court downtown with an attorney is often severe. One can easily
imagine the resistance level increasing in the case of individuals entering a down-
town courtroom alone, without the crutch of an attorney to lean on.
75. Having talked with various legal aid attorneys about the frequency of "no
shows" at scheduled office appointments, let alone the more serious "no shows" at
scheduled court hearings, this writer believes that the natural tension present in any
conflict situation becomes overpowering to many plaintiffs who can only escape
their anxiety by "dropping the matter."
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as such they stress the point which the questionnaire responses
stress: Why should neighborhood people have to go to the corporate
structure in the heart of Chicago's political/financial district to liti-
gate a $200 "fender-bender?" Why should a small claims court be
unable to come to the neighborhoods, if not on a sustained basis, at
least at regular intervals?
Indeed, Judge J. Skelly Wright has raised the same questions.7 6
The people of Chicago are expressing the same feelings as Judge
Wright. The 106 questionnaires compiled dealing with the pro
se court indicated a preference that branches of the pro se court
be located throughout Chicago's neighborhoods. Recall, that to
many poor, racially and economicaly oppressed people there exists
a real fear of entering the center city and its fortified court tower.
However, fear cuts both ways, which is to note that cultural disfunc-
tionality affects all people. The trouble is that most people often
exaggerate imaginary or insignificant fears while failing to fear that
which is real-injustice.
Although the establishment of a pro se court is a significant step
on the path of justice, the branching out of the forum into the city's
multifarious neighborhoods would represent a significant break-
through in small claims settlement. Accessability, awareness, and
resulting utilization of the pro se forum would skyrocket. 77
As to the preference for holding evening and Saturday pro se
court sessions, an overwhelming majority of 103 out of 106 of those
returning the questionnaires responded affirmatively. Time off
from work is very costly for most wage earners. It should be noted,
however, that students observed pro se judges often taking into con-
sideration the wages which were lost by the plaintiff due to the prose-
cution of the claim when entering judgment or when prompting an
in-court settlement .7s But the fact remains that given the expense
76. See Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 26.
77. Judge Wright has written that "the promise of the small claims courts has
not been fulfilled, for in actual operation there is little correspondence between
the professed aims of these courts and the ends they serve.... .. Wright, supra
note 76, at 102.
78. The student observers reported many instances where the court's equity and
ancillary powers were involved to "do justice" as the situation required. For ex-
ample, a female plaintiff was awarded "out-of-pocket" damages for lost wages as a
result of appearing for trial on the scheduled day at which time the defendant had
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and time required to be downtown by 3 P.M. to attend a trial, an
afternoon's wages are often lost. People wishing to utilize the pro
se court may often be financially unable to take the time off. As
noted previously, the objective in establishing the special pro se
branch was to provide "substantial justice" in the expedited adjudi-
cation of small claims of individuals.7" It is probable that as the
community's general awareness of the pro se forum increases, its
popularity and use will correspondingly increase. Indeed, this has
already begun to happen. Earlier projections of 3,000 to 4,000 an-
nual filings have been far surpassed. A current projection foresees
as many as 8,000 to 9,000 claims being filed in the period from
May 15, 1973 to May 15, 1974 which is the second year of the
court's existence.
This large case volume without question creates significant court
administrative problems, and the volume of cases undoubtedly will
continue to increase. It is submitted, however, that these adminis-
trative problems must be solved not at the cost of limiting the ac-
cessability and effectiveness of the forum, for example, by permitting
a backlog of claims to develop, by using diverting "administrative
arguments" as the basis for declining to branch out into the neigh-
borhoods, by limiting the courts' sitting hours or refusing to length-
en the hours when demand warrants, or by limiting the number and
availability of assigned judges to the pro se branch."
Rather, additional judges should be added if necessary and as-
signed to join Judge Poynton and other jurists in administering small
claims justice. For although the monetary value of the claims may
seem small, the human and societal import is great. In fact, the ulti-
mate issues involved in the effective workings of a small claims
court surely include notions of community purpose and well being,
respect for law, faith in the deliberative formal processes of con-
flict resolution, and the highest belief in human dignity with a re-
spect for proprietyship in property. In short, these notions are the
necessary ingredients for faith in the "system."
failed to appear. The defendant had subsequently moved to vacate entry of a
default judgment.
79. See Fox, note 52 supra.
80. This is not to suggest that any of the listed responses have actually oc-




True, this list is expansive, but the notions included in the list
underlie the effectiveness of the entire legal process. If the small
claims forum can strengthen the citizenry's faith in the role of law
in the community it serves, the pro se branch will become the single
most important court in the city. The legal community has contin-
ually asserted that courts should be readily available for all persons;
yet these conflict-resolution forums continue to be inaccessible to a
large portion of Chicago's population.
The need for a workable small claims forum has long been recog-
nized yet longer still in becoming a reality. The Circuit Court of
Cook County has now taken the splendid first step by establishing
the special pro se branch. To make the court more effective, both
the Chicago Council of Lawyers and the Young Lawyers Section of
the Chicago Bar Association have been preparing litigants' manuals
designed to walk plaintiffs through every step required to prosecute
their claims.8' Indeed, the Chicago Bar Association has already
completed a pro se court manual in a "walk-through" format which
will be of invaluable assistance to plaintiffs."2 Consequently, "sec-
ond steps" are being taken.
Despite the pro se forum's establishment, despite rules preventing
it from being transformed into a collection court, and despite its en-
abling order allowing the judges to relax strict evidenciary rules,"8
81. As of September 1, 1973, a pro se handbook titled, How to File a Lawsuit
in the Special Pro Se Branch of the Small Claims Court had been put into a thirteen
page draft version by the Young Lawyer's Section of the Chicago Bar Association
under the direction of Frederic B. Weinstein, Patrick Stodola and John J. Held, Jr.
The draft appears to be well written in simple, generally comprehensible language.
"Legalese" is laudably kept to a minimum but a few terms are not adequately
explained, for example, "filing an appearance."
82. The Chicago Bar Association draft, although written in plain, simple lan-
guage, is not written in pedestrian, "street" language or in Spanish, and both addi-
tional "translations" are recommended to serve legitimate audiences.
83. Rule 6 of the pro se branch reads as follows:
NATURE OF HEARING
On the trial date the court shall proceed with the trial of the cause or
enter any and all appropriate orders. For the purpose of obtaining sub-
stantial justice, the rules of evidence shall be liberally construed and the
court may admit any evidence it deems material and proper. It shall be
the duty of the court to develop all of the facts in the particular case and
to decide the claim in accordance with the rules and principles of sub-
stantive law. In the exercise of this duty, the court may propound any
questions of any witness or party to the suit or upon its own motion may
summon any party to appear as a witness in the suit as in the discretion of
the court appears necessary.
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despite an increasing public awareness of its existence, and despite
the publication and distribution of walk-through manuals for plain-
tiffs, the long-term success of the special pro se branch remains in
doubt.
The pro se idea has proven itself to be a workable one. How-
ever, the existing court, located in the Civic Center and meeting in the
afternoon should not be considered a panacea. Neighborhood pro se
courts holding evening and Saturday sessions would bring the forum
to the people who in many instances are today foreclosed access to it
due to economic, social and psychological factors.
Even if the pro se court "goes to the people," and establishes
neighborhood branches, its long-term success in attaining "sub-
stantial justice" in a critical, qualitative manner will depend most of
all on the sensitivity of the presiding judges to human hopes and as-
pirations; to human feelings, including fear, anger, frustration, and
disappointment; and to human failing."4
In the last analysis, it is the judges own patience, compassion and
experience which will effectuate the goals set for the pro se court;
the law will be used to further promote a more idealistic concept of
justice. s5
This is said in part because of an interesting, unanticipated find-
GENERAL ORDER Rule 6. For additional rules which tend to relax the formalism
of the traditional courtroom procedure, see GENERAL ORDER Rules 2, 3, 4(D) and
5(A), (B).
84. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), and K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). The late Judge Learned Hand
perhaps unwittingly sounded the alarm when he wrote:
Judges are usually taken from that part of the bar which has distin-
guished itself in the field of action. They are likely to be men of strong
will, set beliefs and conventional ideals.
L. HAND, Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five, reprinted in, THE SPIT OF LIBERTY
at 24 (1952).
85. This writer starts with the jurisprudential view that law (rules, authorita-
tive decisions, and authoritative decision processes) is neutral. That law is a
mechanism capable of great justice but capable of great injustice, for example, the
legal sanctioning of acts against humanity by officials of the Third Reich. And
legal processes, which produce adjudication, which for economic or other reasons
are generally final and non-reviewable, as in the case of a small claims court, can
easily become arbitrary, expedited decisional processes only. It is suggested that
in certain high-volume traffic-type courts throughout the country such blurring of
purpose and shodiness of decision have resulted. Judges must constantly remind
themselves that "right" decisions are immeasurably more important than decisions
per se-that judicial efficiency should always be subordinate to the search for jus-
tice and truth in each case.
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ing that came out of the pro se court study. Each of the DePaul
law students observing the pro se court sessions independently formed
an identical opinion-the particular judge makes all the difference as
to whether the court's process is used to attain substantial justice or,
on the other hand, the proceeding is a "wasted-motion" presenta-
tion. In short, the student observers concluded that if the judge
listens to and cares for the litigants, if the judge realizes that much
more is at stake than a $195 claim for damages, the pro se court ac-
complishes its goal. If, however, an assigned judge considers the
pro se assignment as tantamount to kitchen patrol, then the pro se
court experience may result in promoting distrust and bitterness among
the participants.
In conclusion, the Pro Se Branch of the Circuit Court of Cook
County has made a good showing in its brief existence, having pro-
vided a forum for the inexpensive and prompt adjudication of small
claims by individuals and consumers.
The creation of the pro se branch was late in coming but to quote
the late Justice Felix Frankfurter: "wisdom so seldom ever comes
that one ought not reject it merely because it comes late." 6
One brief word is in order concerning arbitration as an alternate
consumer relief. The number and intensity of suggestions that ar-
bitration settlement procedures be established for consumer com-
plaint resolution are increasing.87 Indeed, the Council of Better
Business Bureaus has advocated a national program of consumer
arbitration."8
It is suggested that should the Cook County pro se branch not be
expanded and introduced into Chicago's neighborhoods as recom-
mended, then a county-wide arbitration system might be established.
There is at least one such forum in operation today in Arlington
County, Virginia where in late 1971, the Arlington County Board
of Commissioners established by ordinance the Arlington Consumer
Protection Commission." This is a conciliation board, however, and
86. Bartelt, Dean's Comments, 1 VAL. U.L. REv. ix (1966).
87. See, e.g., Rothschild and Davis, How to Protect Consumers Through Local
Regulation and Arbitration, 1 LOYOLA CONS. PROT. L.J. 26 (1972).
88. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS AND
CONSUMERS (1972).
89. See ROTHSCHILD AND CARROL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE
679 (text), and rules promulgated thereto 681-92 (1973).
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is not empowered to conduct binding arbitration proceedings unless
both parties, the consumer and the merchant, volunteer and agree.
Although compulsory binding arbitration creates substantial legal
problems in non-collective bargaining circumstances, with appro-
priate state enabling legislation, such compulsory arbitration pro-
cedures might afford certain advantages over even pro se judicial
adjudication, especially regarding the intimidation effect of judicial
proceedings.
The pro se branch of Cook County is not, nor should it ever be
considered the final solution in creating an institutionalized forum
for consumer relief. The pro se court is not located where the peo-
ple are; it is, moreover, a judicial forum; it produces by its nature
and location tremendous psychic resistance to its use among num-
bers of potential litigants. It is, frankly, an intimidating institu-
tion 90-a formal court in a formal building, in the foreboding, sky-
scraper filled, business-oriented Loop. It is in the territory of
"the other side." It is separate from the people. All the rhetoric
about the administrative problems in establishing a neighborhood
forum cannot mask this one simple fact. Any court located in the
Civic Center a block from the First National Plaza, two blocks from
the Standard Oil Building and four blocks from the Sears Tower, just
across the street from City Hall, a short block to LaSalle Street is
going to have a hard time calling itself a "people's court." After all,
that really is what a pro se, consumer court is-for at issue are peo-
ple's interests-hopes and frustrations-human disappointments. The
legal community needs to work more diligently to assure that con-
flict resolution forums designed for small consumer claims for relief
are not in themselves conflict promotive which would act to fore-
close access to those persons who may have the greatest need for
the relief sought.
PART THREE
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
IMPROVEMENT ACT
On September 12, 1973, the United States Senate passed the Mag-
90. See Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as




nuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act.9 As of this writing, the Bill is pending in the House of Rep-
resentatives, having been referred on September 13, 1973 to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
The proposed statute attempts to cover a number of issues-no-
tably, consumer product warranty disclosure;92 increased enforce-
ment powers for the Federal Trade Commission; 3 authorizations to
the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit Union
Administration to each establish a separate division of consumer af-
fairs; and finally, used-car warranty disclosure requirements.95
The Bill's preamble sets out the congressional intent to "provide
disclosure standards for written consumer product warranties against
defect or malfunction; to define Federal content standards for such
warranties; to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to
improve its consumer protection activities; and for other purposes."96
The Bill, sadly, is another example of federal legislation regulating
relatively trivial matters while leaving unaffected the basic "rights"
of merchants to disclaim obligations, to limit liabilities, and to re-
strict remedies. This weakness is reflected in the most significant
language in the Magnuson-Moss bill, found in Section 102(b)-
there is no requirement that any product or part be warranted.9"
91. S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
92. id. § 101-114.
93. Id. 3H 201-211.
94. Id. § 301.
95. Id. §H 401-404.
96. Id. § 1.
97. The full text of § 102(b) reads:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to authorize the Commission to
prescribe the duration of warranties given or to require that a product or
any of its components be warranted except that the Commission may pre-
scribe rules pursuant to section 553 of title 5, United States Code, that the
term of a warranty or service contract shall be extended to correspond
with any period in excess of a reasonable period (not less than ten days)
during which the purchaser is deprived of the use of a product by reason
of a defect or malfunction. Except as provided in section 104 of this
title, nothing in this title shall be deemed to authorize the Commission to
prescribe the scope or substance of written warranties.
S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b) (1973).
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In essence, the "right to disclaim," implied warranties"8 as author-
ized by section 2-316 of the Uniform Commerical Code99 remains
98. UCC § 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units in-
volved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
UCC § 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the good shall be fit for such purpose.
99. UCC § 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to
the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-
202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such con-
struction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by
a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "there are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other lan-
guage which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to de-
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absolute. The new law only goes to the manner of disclaiming and
to the manner of warranting. It is, in short, cosmetic. In form, the
legislation pretends to be pro-consumer, but a brief view of Title I
exposes the effort as a sham. However, before pursuing this thesis
a prefatory note concerning private autonomy is in order.
The Uniform Commercial Code's affirmative warranty provisions
applicable to sales of goods (§§ 2-312-2-315) impose on a seller
responsibilities as to the quality and characteristics of merchandise
sold in the stream of commerce. Even if the parties remain silent
as to quality of goods at the time of contracting, the Code, invariably
enacted as state law, imposes an implied warranty of merchanta-
bility on the sellers. Antithetical to this ideal, is the persistent com-
mon law tradition of contract law; that commercial law has developed
largely through private ordering predicated on private autonomy-
that parties can agree to do (and to be responsible for) whatever
they please. Given this strong, pervasive historical private autonomy
principle, it is no wonder that non-consensual obligations in private
sale transactions seem out of place. And implied warranty liability
is certainly predicated on theories other than private autonomy. So
to fit warranty obligations into the private autonomy scheme, the
draftsmen of the Code included section 2-316, which simply allows
a party to avoid all warranty liability through the insertion of a dis-
claimer clause, appropriately worded, in the original contract.
The "freedom to contract" theory has thus been the basis for the
freedom to disclaim any responsibility for a products' quality when
selling that product in the marketplace. But given a look at the
underlying premise-that freedom of contract is a fundamental
right, it becomes clear that the right to be free from personal, econ-
omic, and psychological harm resulting from the use of defective or
unmerchantable products is a fundamental principle as well.
A merchant should clearly not be permitted to place a "new" pro-
uct into the stream of commerce which turns out to be unfit for its
fects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
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ordinary use and then avoid responsibility for the unfitness because
the law affords the merchant the "freedom of contract" to initially
disclaim any responsibility. The consumer does not, in fact, have
this fundamental freedom of contract. Today, we have a take-it-or-
leave-it consumer marketplace. Few otherwise intelligent persons
even know that they have the power to bargain with a merchant over
a printed clause on a sales form; fewer do; fewer still do so success-
fully. This is not a barter society. The consumer's marketplace
vocabulary consists of two phrases only: "I'll take it," and "no
thank you." On the one hand, the merchant voluntarily enters the
marketplace and is allowed the relative freedom to choose his mar-
ket, to pick his supplier, to induce demand for his wares through ad-
vertising; all in the name of profit. In the process, he is allowed to
turn around and deny all responsibility for the product after it leaves
his hands, provided he properly disclaims further responsibility.
The buyer, on the other hand, is given no meaningful choice other
than to buy with the disclaimer or not to buy at all. The net effect
of this process is to put the merchant in a citadel surrounded by
a deep moat of legal powers, rights and privileges.
So then, one asks, what does the Magnuson-Moss bill do? It does
what Title One of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,
otherwise known as Truth-in-Lending, does. It requires specific
language, specific terminology, to be disclosed in conspicuous fashion
when warranting or when disclaiming. To the extent that the leg-
islation requires such explicitness, it is probably well-intended. In-
deed, were it not for the escape clause in section 102(b)'0° this
could have been significant legislation. The framework for promul-
gation of warranty disclosure requirements is set out in section 102
(a) which authorizes the FTC to issue rules which may:
(1) prescribe the manner and form in which information with respect
to any written warranty shall be clearly and conspicuously presented or
displayed when such information is contained in advertising, labeling, point-
of-sale material, or other representations in writing; and
(2) require the inclusion in any written warranty, in simple and readily
understood language, fully and conspicuously disclosed, items of information
which may include, among others:
(A) clear identification of the name and address of the warrantor;
100. See note 97 and accompanying text, supra.
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(B) identity of the class or classes of persons to whom the warranty is
extended;
(C) the products or parts covered;
(D) a statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect
or malfunction-at whose expense-and for what period of time;
(E) a statement of what the purchaser must do and what expenses he
must bear;
(F) exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty;
(G) the step-by-step procedure which the purchaser should take in order
to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the
identification of any class of persons authorized to perform the obligations
set forth in the warranty;
(H) on what days and during what hours the warrantor will perform
his obligations;
(I) the period of time within which, after notice of malfunction or de-
fect, the warrantor will under normal circumstances repair, replace, or other-
wise perform any obligations under the warranty;
(J) the availability of any informal dispute settlement procedure of-
fered by the warrantor and a recital that the purchaser must resort to such
procedure before pursuing any legal remedies in the courts; and
(K) a recital that any purchaser who successfully pursues his legal rem-
edies in court may recover the reasonable costs incurred, included reason-
able attorneys' fees. 10 1
Note first that the Commission is not required to promulgate reg-
ulations covering all of the items listed. Also, it is possible to specu-
late that should the FTC promulgate especially detailed disclosure
rules, many former warrantors will begin to use the considerably
safer total disclaimer disclosure permitted under sections 102(b),
and 108 of the bill, which are validated by section 2-316 of the
UCC. 1°2  In short, section 108(a) makes it clear that one can only
disclaim implied warranties when one has not made any written ex-
press warranties. The lesson is clear to the supplier or merchant:
negate all warranties.
Section 108 is titled "Limitations on Disclaimer of Implied War-
ranties." 03 The title is misleading since the limitations noted above
101. S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1973).
102. See note 99, supra.
103. The full text of § 108 reads:
(a) There shall be no express disclaimer of implied warranties to a pur-
chaser if any written warranty or service contract in writing is made by a
supplier to a purchaser with regard to a consumer product.
(b) For purposes of this title, implied warranties may not be limited
as to duration expressly or impliedly through a designated warranty in
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:98
really arise only when there is an express warranty combined with
an express disclaimer of implied warranties-in other words, where
there is a conflict. And section 2-317 of the UCC operates to make
ineffective an implied warranty disclaimer as against an express war-
ranty covering the same product quality or characteristic. 1 4
Moreover, subsection (b) of section 108 of the Magnuson-Moss
Bill limits a merchant's ability to limit the duration of an implied
warranty. 105  In truth, few merchants do so. Generally the mer-
chant is either silent as to implied warranties so that they automati-
cally attach to the transaction or they expressly negate them so that
the warranties never attach. Rarely does one give a six-month im-
plied warranty.
As to different "types" of warranties, the Magnuson-Moss Bill
distinguishes, first, between what it calls a "full warranty,"'0 8 sec-
ond, a written warranty incorporating the uniform federal standards
and third, a "limited warranty,"'1 7 or one which does not incorpo-
rate the uniform federal standards.
The "Uniform Federal Standards for Written Warranty" are set
out in section 104(a) which obligates a warrantor of a consumer
product as defined in the bill: 108
writing or other express warranty.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
104. UCC § 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties Express or Implied.
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent
with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreason-
able the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is domi-
nant. In ascertaining that the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or
model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general
language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other
than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
105. See note 103, supra.
106. The definitional section of the Magnuson-Moss Bill provides:
"Full warranty" means a written warranty which incorporates the uni-
form Federal standards for warranty set forth in section 104 of this title.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(10)(A) (1973).
107. "Limited warranty" means
written warranty subject to the provisions of this title which does not in-
corporate at a minimum the uniform Federal standard for warranty set
forth in section 104 of this title.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(10)(B) (1973).
108. "Consumer product" means
any tangible personal property which is normally used for personal, faro-
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(1) to repair or replace any malfunctioning or defective consumer product
covered by such warranty;
(2) within a reasonable time, and
(3) without charge. 109
The section goes on, however, to provide that the duties extending
to the consumer "shall not be required of the warrantor . . . if he
can show that damage while in the purchaser's possession or unrea-
sonable use (including failure to provide reasonable and necessary
maintenance) caused any warranted consumer product to malfunc-
tion or become defective."" 0 Many interpretative problems will
surely ensue under the amorphous language of this section.
Section 103 requires that written warranties be conspicuously
and clearly designated. If such a warranty follows the uniform fed-
eral standards for written warranty and does not limit the liability
of the warrantor then it shall be designated as "full." Alternatively,
while meeting federal standards, liability for consequential damages
may be limited, leaving the remedy as free repair or replacement.'
ily, or household purposes, including any such property intended to be
attached to or installed in any real property regardless of whether it is so
attached or installed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of
sections 102 and 103 of this title affecting consumer products apply only to
consumer products each of which actually costs the purchaser more than
five dollars.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(2) (1973).
109. Id. § 104.
110. The full text of § 104(d) provides:
The performance of the duties enumerated in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion shall not be required of the warrantor if he can show that damage
while in the possession of the purchaser or unreasonable use (including
failure to provide reasonable and necessary maintenance) caused any war-
ranted consumer product to malfunction or become defective.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
111. Sec. 103. (a) Any supplier warranting in writing a consumer prod-
uct shall clearly and conspicuously designate such warranty as provided
herein unless exempted from doing so by the Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 109 of this title:
(1) If the written warranty incorporates the uniform Federal standards
for warranty set forth in section 104 of this title, and does not limit the
liability of the warrantor for consequential damages, then it shall be con-
spicuously designated as "full (statement of duration)" warranty, guaranty,
or word of similar meaning. If the written warranty incorporates the uni-
form Federal standards for written warranty set forth in section 104 of
this title and limits or excludes the liability of the warrantor for conse-
quential damages as permitted by applicable State law, then it shall be
conspicuously designated as "full (statement of duration)" warranty,
guaranty, or word of similar import. "(Liability for consequential damages
limited; remedy limited to free repair or replacement within a reasonable
time, without charge)", or as otherwise prescribed by the Commission pur-
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If the warranty does not comport with federal standards, it must
be designated so as to indicate its limited scope.
Section 110 interestingly provides for private remedies by encour-
aging consumer-supplier arbitration, although not using the term.112
This is accomplished by a declaration of congressional policy in sub-
section (a). It reads in part:
SEc. 110. (a) Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage
suppliers to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and
expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms. Such
informal dispute settlement procedures should be created by suppliers in
cooperation with independent and governmental entities pursuant to guide-
lines established by the Commission. If a supplier incorporates any such
informal dispute settlement procedure in any written warranty or service
contract, such procedure shall initially be used by any consumer to resolve
any complaint arising under such warranty or service contract .... 113
Section 110 goes on to provide for private actions in federal dis-
trict courts subject to the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, but only after there has been an opportunity for the supplier
to cure the alleged breach, and following utilization of any informal
mechanism earlier agreed upon pursuant to section 110(a) for res-
olution.1" The effective date of this new law will be six months
after enactment.'15
Undoubtedly of greater significance to the consumer than the
Title One warranty disclosure provisions is Title II of the Magnuson-
Moss Bill, entitled "Federal Trade Commission Improvments."'' "
This added consumer benefit results from section 202, which would
amend section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act'1 7 to per-
mit the Commission to initiate civil actions in United States district
courts against persons or firms charged with an unfair or deceptive
suant to section 109 of this Act.
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
112. S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1973).
113. Id.
114. The private remedies section provides, in relevant part:
Prior to commencing any legal proceeding for breach of warranty or
service contract under this section, a purchaser must have afforded the sup-
plier a reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged breach and must have
used the informal dispute settlement mechanisms, if any, established under
subsection (a) of this section. ...
S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 110(b) (1973).
115. Id. § 114.
116. Id. §§ 201-11.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
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practice in order to obtain a civil penalty of not more than $10,000
for each violation."' Thus, the Commission's remedies and options
for section 5(a) violations enforcement are considerably expanded
and strengthened, this in addition to the stricter penalties prescribed
by the Act.
Of even greater consumer significance, however, is the proposed
new subsection (8) of section 5(a) which permits the Commission
after issuing a cease and desist order which has become final, to in-
stitute civil actions in federal district courts "to obtain such relief
as the court shall find necessary to redress injury to consumers"
caused by the 5(a) violation, including recission or reformation of
contracts, refund of money, return of property and the payment of
actual damages. 119 In short, the FTC may in effect initiate a quasi-
consumer class action for relief.120  Note, however, that the Com-
mission's authorization to bring civil suits for consumer relief is
discretionary and not mandatory.' 2'
Title IV of the Magnuson-Moss Bill, returns to the warranty prob-
lem but this time in a narrower context-used car warranties. 22
118. S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1973).
119. SEC. 203. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
45(a) ) is amended by inserting after paragraph (7) as added by section 202 of
this title the following new paragraph:
"(8) After an order of the Commission to cease and desist from en-
gaging in acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive to consumers and
proscribed by section 5(a)(1) of this Act has become final as provided in
subsection (g) of this section, the Commission, by any of its attorneys
designated by it for such purpose, may institute civil actions in the district
courts of the United States to obtain such relief as the court shall find
necessary to redress injury to consumers caused by the specific acts or prac-
tices which were the subject of the proceeding pursuant to subsection (b)
of this section and the resulting cease-and-desist order, including, but not
limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or
return of property, public notification of the violation, and the payment of
damages, except that nothing in this section is intended to authorize the
imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages. The court shall cause
notice to be given reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to
apprise all consumers allegedly injured by the defendant's acts of the
pendency of such action. ...
120. Recall that private litigants have no direct cause of actions under provi-
sions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 8H 40, et seq. (1970).
121. The key phase in § 203, rendering its use discretionary, is that the "Com-
mission ...may initiate Civil actions ...... S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203
(1973).
122. Id. 88 401-404.
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Section 402 prescribes that no dealer' shall sell or offer for sale a
used motor vehicle"2 4 to a consumer without a written warranty which
conforms with the detailed disclosure requirements of section 403,
unless the contract for sale contains in conspicuous type the notice:
"ALL REPAIRS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BUYER."' 25  In addi-
tion for one to disclaim effectively all warranty liability, it appears
that one must also comply with both Title I of the Magnuson-Moss
Bill and section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2 '
Yet even should a dealer sell a used motor vehicle without any
warranty as permitted and as prescribed in Title IV, the dealer still
will have to comply with the requirements of section 403(a) and (b),
mandating him prior to the signing of any contract to furnish the
purchaser with a written statement containing:
(1) a complete description of such used motor vehicle, including, but not
necessarily limited to-
(A) the make, model, year of manufacture, and any identification or
serial numbers of such vehicle;
(B) a statement of any mechanical defects known to such dealer on the
basis of his examination and evaluation of the vehicle prior to his acquisi-
tion of such vehicle or which otherwise becomes known to him while in his
possession, and any repairs made by or under the direction of such dealer
following his acquisition of such used motor vehicle;
(C) a statement of the written warranty coverage of the used motor
vehicle, except that if the used motor vehicle is sold without a written war-
ranty, the dealer shall enter the words "As Is-all repairs are the responsi-
bility of the buyer" in the space provided for warranty coverage;
123. SEc. 401. As used in this title-(l) "Dealer" means any supplier selling
used motor vehicles to a consumer.
124. SEC. 401(5). "Used motor vehicle" means
any motor vehicle which is offered for sale to a consumer after-
(A) such vehicle had previously been sold to a consumer; or
(B) such vehicle had been used by a dealer or any other person for
the personal transportation of persons, or as a rental, driver-education, or
demonstration motor vehicle and driven more than two hundred and fifty
miles or so used for more than fifteen days.
125. The warranty requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Bill provide in section
402(b):
A dealer may sell or offer for sale a used motor vehicle to a consumer
without a written warranty if the contract for sale of such used motor
vehicle contains the following notice in conspicuous type: "ALL REPAIRS
ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BUYER." If such contract is
not written in the English language, then such notice shall be expressed in
the same language as the contract. In addition, the dealer shall orally dis-
close to the purchaser that all repairs are the responsibility of the buyer.
126. See note 99, supra.
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(D) the date on which such vehicle will be delivered to such purchaser
and the maximum number of miles which will appear on the odometer on
such date; . ..127
In conclusion, should the House pass the Magnuson-Moss Bill in
the version passed by the Senate, the new law would become effec-
tive in six months after date of enactment. Passage however may
be something of a mixed blessing. On one hand, the Bill will have
the effect of regulating warranty disclosures. Yet, on the other
hand, it will probably dramatically increase disclaimers in consumer
sales transactions. The Bill permits disclaimers, while at the same
time it places burdensome obligations upon the manner in which af-
firmative warranties may be created.
But as to the increased enforcement powers, Commission ini-
tiated consumer relief actions, added remedies and enforcement op-
tions delegated to the Federal Trade Commission under Article Two,
one can only say well drafted, well enacted, well done. Let the
House follow the path of wisdom.
PART FOUR
TRUTH-IN-LENDING
On April 24, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down its first de-
cision, Mourning v. Family Publications Service,128 interpreting the
limits of the authority which Congress delegated to the Federal Re-
serve Board under section 105 of the federal Truth-in-Lending Act.2 9
Specifically at issue was whether the Board had exceeded its au-
thority in promulgating the so-called "Four-Installment Rule," one
portion of the Board's enforcement regulation commonly called Reg-
ulation Z.130
The Four-Installment Rule is found in section 226.2(k) of Reg-
ulation Z, which defines the term "Consumer Credit" to include
any extension of credit for personal, family, household or agricul-
tural purposes for which a finance charge is imposed, or "which,
127. S.356, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 403 (1973).
128. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1604 (1970). Senator Paul Douglas (D. Ill.) first in-
troduced Truth-in-Lending in 1960.
130. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. (1973). Truth-in-Lending originally went into
effect July 1, 1969.
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pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than four
installments."''
At this point it is important to review the facts before turning to
the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue. A salesperson for a
corporation which solicits magazine subscriptions called on a 73
year-old widow and induced her to subscribe to four magazines for
a five-year period. She agreed to pay $3.95 immediately, and $3.95
per month for 30 months. Thus, the total expenditures for the
four subscriptions came to $122.45. The sales contract contained
both a non-cancellation clause and an acceleration clause which
would have the effect of making the entire balance due upon the de-
fault of any installment.' 32
The contract signed by the purchaser did not contain either the
total purchase price of the subscriptions ($122.45) or the total
amount financed ($118.50). Of course, there was no recitation of
any finance charge since there appeared to be none, that is, the total
deferred payment price of $122.45 was identical to the cash price
had the purchaser opted to pay the entire contract at the outset.
After making the down payment and after beginning to receive
the magazines, the subscriber defaulted. The magazine-solicitation
firm then declared the entire balance due ($118.50) pursuant to the
acceleration provision of the contract and threatened legal action.
Subsequently the purchaser took the offensive by filing suit against
the magazine firm in a Florida federal district court. She alleged that
the firm had failed to comply with the disclosure provisions of the
Truth-in-Lending Act. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment,
the district court, relying upon the Four-Installment Rule of Regula-
tion Z, held in favor of the purchaser, and granted her motion for
summary judgment. As a finding of fact, the district court de-
clared that the seller, Family Publications Service, Inc., had extended
credit to the buyer, Leida Mourning, which by agreement was pay-
able in more than four installments.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subse-
131. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973).
132. The contract signed by the purchaser was similar in many respects to retail
installment sales contracts which typically contain a default-acceleration provision.
133. 411 U.S. at 362.
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quently reversed the Florida district court's ruling, holding that the
Federal Reserve Board had exceeded its statutory delegation of au-
thority in promulgating the Four-Installment Rule.' The Fifth Cir-
cuit believed that the rule conflicted with section 121, the general
disclosure requirement provision of the enabling statute.'3 5  The
Fifth Circuit also held, as an alternative ground for its decision, that
the Four-Installment Rule created a conclusive presumption that
payments exceeding four in number included a finance charge,
and that such an irrebutable presumption of fact violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution." 8'
Given this factual situation, the Supreme Court was faced with its
first opportunity to interpret the scope of the Truth-in-Lending dis-
closure requirements. Initially, the Court reviewed the policy rea-
sons which supported the passage of the Truth-in-Lending Act. In
what can only be described as an understatement, the Court noted that
by the time of passage in 1968, "it had become abundantly clear that
the use of consumer credit was expanding at an extremely rapid
rate.'
3 7
The Court pointed to the astonishing figures, which indicated
that from 1946 to 1967 consumer credit had grown from $5.6 bil-
lion to nearly $100 billion, representing a growth rate of more than
four and one-half times that of the economy as a whole.' 3 8 By
stressing the magnitude of consumer credit, the Court was under-
scoring the magnitude of the social and economic interest underlying
Truth-in-Lending. These interests are partially mentioned in sec-
tion 102 of the Act, where Congress declared the positive benefits
to be derived from the "informed use of credit" which results from
134. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1971).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970); which reads:
General requirement of disclosure.
(a) Each creditor shall disclose clearly and conspicuously, in accord-
ance with the regulations of the Board, to each person to whom con-
sumer credit is extended and upon whom a finance charge is or may be
imposed, the information required under this part.
136. The Fifth Circuit cited Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) and
Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) in support of its presump-
tion-due process conclusion. 449 F.2d at 242.
137. 411 U.S. at 363.
138. Id. The Court cited a House report for these statistics. H.R. REP. No.
1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967).
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a consumer's awareness of credit costs.13 9
Having briefly noted the pro-consumer policies underlying Truth-
in-Lending, the Court next pointed out that a creditor could circum-
vent the objectives by "burying the cost of credit in the price of goods
sold."140
There can be no doubt that a merchant (one who predominantly
sells hard, durable goods such as furniture) who is located in a
neighborhood of a city where most customers are unable to make
sizeable cash purchases, will likely make most sales on a credit-in-
stallment basis. Often what is significant to the prosepective buyer,
however, is the amount of the periodic payment rather than the total
cash price of the goods.' Rather than quote a low or even com-
petitive (vis-a-vis some other dealer's) cash price along with a sub-
stantially larger deferred "time price" (the difference between which
the Truth-in-Lending Act declares to be the "Finance Charge" or
the "time-price differential"), a merchant might elect to raise the
"cash price" to the deferred time price level. Does this mean that
there is little or no time-price differential? Does this mean that there
is no finance charge? Does this mean that if there is no finance
charge, that disclosure of all terms required by Truth-in-Lending need
not be made?
Merchants hoped so. The Family Publications Service of Florida
hoped so. For if a merchant is not required to disclose the entire
amount of all payments, for example, arguably more customers at
the point of sale will agree willingly to pay a "cash price" on a "no-
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970):
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms en-
gaging in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the
informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an aware-
ness of the costs thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this sub-
chapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
140. 411 U.S. at 366.
141. The Federal Trade Commission 1966 study on retail installment sales prac-
tices within the District of Columbia clearly shows that merchants operating in
economically depressed sections of the city marked up the "cash" prices of durables
far above the average mark ups put on identical products by "downtown" merchants
who sold proportionately more items on a cash basis than did the ghetto area mer-
chant. FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRAC-
TICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (March 1968).
142 [Vol. 23:98
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finance" deferred, installment-sale basis, not realizing or under-
standing that the finance charge has been hidden. That is exactly
what happened to the purchaser in the Mourning case. Fortunately,
the Supreme Court recognized this "burial" of the finance charge in
the inflated cash price of the goods sold.' 42
In writing the majority opinion in Mourning, Chief Justice Burger
quoted from Senator Paul Douglas', remarks in Senate Hearings on
the Truth-in-Lending Bill where the Illinois Senator pointed out that
if a merchant tries to hide a finance charge by burying it in a high
cash price, then, provided there is the requisite disclosure of both the
total price and total finance terms, "the purchaser can shop on price
just as on the finance charges."'143
The Federal Reserve Board in its original draft of Regulation Z
included the Four-Installment Rule. In an early advisory letter, the
Board noted that the Four-Installment Rule was "imperative" so as
not to encourage the burying of the finance charge in the cash price. 4
With this clear Congressional concern revealed, the stage was set
for the application of the traditional delegation of authority standard:
that the agency "may 'make . . such rules and regulations as may
142. In a footnote, the Court set up the following illustration of the burial of
finance charges through an inflated cash-price markup:
For example, two merchants might buy watches at wholesale for $20 which
normally sell at retail for $40. Both might sell immediately to a consumer
who agreed to pay $1 per week for 52 weeks. In one case, the merchant
might claim that the price of the watch was $40 and that the remaining $12
constituted a charge for extending credit to the consumer. From the con-
sumer's point of view, the credit charge represents the cost which he
must pay for the privilege of deferring payment of the debt he has in-
curred. From the creditor's point of view, much simplified, the charge
may represent the return which he might have earned had he been able to
invest the proceeds from the sale of the watch from the date of the sale
until the date of payment. The second merchant might claim that the price
of the watch was $52 and that credit was free. The second merchant, like
the first, has forgone the profits which he might have achieved by invest-
ing the sale proceeds from the day of the sale on. The second merchant
may be said to have "buried" this cost in the price of the item sold. By
whatever name, the $12 differential between the total payments and the
price at which the merchandise could have been acquired is the cost of de-
ferring payment.
411 U.S. at 366 n.26.
143. Hearings on S. 1740 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 447-48 (1961).
144. Federal Reserve Board Advisory Letter of March 3, 1970, by J.L. Robert.
son, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, 30,320 (April 2, 1970).
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be necessary' . . . will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably re-
lated to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'"145 The Supreme
Court held that not only is the Board empowered to regulate hidden
or buried finance charges, but that the measure chosen, the Four-
Installment Rule, is reasonably related to its objectives. Moreover,
the Court noted that "[t]he burdens imposed on creditors are not
severe, when measured against the evils which are avoided."' 4
Turning to the fifth amendment due process argument, the Court
simply stated that the Four-Installment Rule contains no irrebutable
presumption since it "does not presume that all creditors who are
within its ambit assess finance charges, but, rather, [it] imposes a
disclosure requirement on all members of a defined class in order to
discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class."' 47
Chief Justice Burger then observed that the Truth-in-Lending Act
reflects a transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of let-
the-buyer-beware to one of let-the-seller-disclose.' 8 He is right,
of course, as evidenced by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,14 9
the Flammable Fabrics Act, 5 ° the Wool Products Labeling Act,' 5 '
the Fur Products Labeling Act, 52 the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act' 5 ' and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act' where all require significant disclosures, designed to increase
the knowledge of consumers so that they will be able to make wiser
decisions in the consumer marketplace. Truth-in-Lending 5  is
only one of a series of legislative tamperings with the classicial con-
ception of the consumer marketplace. Moreover, Truth-in-Lending,
like the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Bill is not as paternalistic as their
opponents claim. The freedom to extend credit, to go into debt,
145. 411 U.S. at 369; citing, Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S.
268, 280-81 (1968).
146. 411 U.S. at 371.
147. Id. at 377.
148. Id.
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1970).
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1970).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1970).
153. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 etseq. (1970).
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to buy "luxuries" and to "over-extend" remains unchallenged and
undisturbed. In any event, Chief Justice Burger commented in
Mourning that the respondent's fear that the Four-Installment Rule
reflects a "paternalistic concern for the consumer is beside the
point."156
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Reserve Board's
"Four-Installment Rule" in Mourning and made it clear in doing so
that the Board indeed has the authority to promulgate rules reasonably
related to the objectives of Truth-in-Lending. The decision is to
be applauded.
The Supreme Court decision also has the effect of upholding
Judge Will of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, who upheld the Four-Installment Rule two years
earlier in a nearly identical factual context in the case of Strompolos
v. Premium Readers Service.'57 Judge Will held that the Four-In-
stallment Rule of Regulation Z was valid. In this case the defendant
was also a broker of magazines. The plaintiff was a representative
for a class of persons purchasing magazine subscriptions from the de-
fendant. Judge Will concluded that the Four-Installment Rule was
not only sensible but "necessary to prevent the Truth-in-Lending
Act from being a hoax and delusion upon the American public.' 158
Turning to other developments relating to Regulation Z and Truth -
in-Lending, it is important to note briefly a few amendments about
to go into effect. On November 1, 1973, amendments to sections
226.2(u), 226.6(a), 226.10(c) and 226.10(d), relating to the
advertising of credit are to become operative.' 59 The amendments
reduce the amount of information a creditor must include in adver-
tising open-ended credit plans such as revolving retail charge ac-
counts or bank card plans. Creditors still must include certain
minimum Truth-in-Lending disclosures in their advertising-the
Annual Percentage Rate (APR), any free-ride period, the method
of determining finance charges, and balances on which finance
charges are imposed. The advertising of "no down payment" is
156. 411 U.S. at 377.
157. 326 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Il. 1971).
158. Id. at 1103.
159. 38 Fed. Reg. 18457 (1973).
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eliminated, however, as a triggering term for disclosure of all other
required terms. 160
Effective January 1, 1974, Section 226.8(b) of Regulation Z is
amended so as to require creditors who do not grant rebates of the
unearned portion of the finance charge upon prepayment of a pre-
computed installment credit to disclose this fact on the Truth-in-
Lending disclosure form.' This amendment, moreover, requires
disclosure of the method of computing a refund of unearned interest
on prepayment of any credit transaction. The amendment would
seem to end the recent speculation as to whether the famous "rule
of 78ths" need be disclosed. 1 2
Without question, the most significant proposed amendments to
Truth-in-Lending since its enactment five years ago are contained in
a bill known as "Truth-in-Lending Act Amendments of 1973. ''163
As of this writing, the Bill has passed the Senate (July 23, 1973),
and is awaiting action by the House of Representatives.'
Title I, known as the "Fair Credit Billing Act," would add a sub-
stantial new element to Truth-in-Lending-the regulation of billing
practices, including the disclosure of "fair billing rights,"' 6' proce-
160. Id. at 18457-58.
161. 38 Fed. Reg. 19814 (1973).
(b) Disclosures in sale and non-sale credit.
(7) Identification of the method of computing any unearned portion of
the finance charge in the event of prepayment in full of an obligation
which includes precomputed finance charges and a statement of the amount
or method of computation of any charge that may be deducted from the
amount of any rebate of such unearned finance charge that will be credited
to an obligation or refunded to the customer. If the credit contract does
not provide for any rebate of unearned finance charges upon prepayment
in full, this fact shall be disclosed.
162. See Smith, Disclosure of Prepayment Rebates Required by Truth-in-Lend-
ing: Recent Developments Involving Rule of 78th, 27 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. 66
(1973). The "rule of 78ths" method of computing that portion of interest which is
unearned upon payment before maturity (whether precomputed, add-on or dis-
count) is derived from the fact that in a twelve month period, if the total of the
digits of all twelve months were added, the sum would be 78.
163. S.2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
164. The Senate version was referred, on July 24, 1973, to the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs. Hearings were
scheduled for late October and early November, 1973. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE, Rep. No. 131, 4 (Oct. 23, 1973).
165. S.2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1973).
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dures for the correction of billing errors, 16 as well as the setting
out of specified rights of credit card customers.' 6'
Title II of the proposed amendments includes a requirement that
advertisements of credit repayable in more than four installments, if
no finance charge is imposed, must clearly and conspicuously state
that "the cost of credit is included in the price quoted for the goods
and services."'61 8  The civil liabilities and penalties, moreover, are
significantly increased under the proposed Title II amendments.' 69
Perhaps of greatest significance is Title III of the proposed amend-
ments, titled "Equal Credit Opportunity,"' 70 which if enacted will
be known as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Act would
amend Truth-in-Lending by adding a new Chapter 5-"Prohibition
of Discrimination Based on Sex or Marital Status." Specifically, the
Act would declare it to be unlawful for any creditor or credit card
issuer to discriminate on account of sex or marital status against any
individual, (1) with regards to the approval or denial of any exten-
sion of consumer credit or with respect to any terms of the credit, or
(2) with respect to the approval, denial, renewal, continuation or
revocation of any open-ended consumer credit account or any terms
thereof. 7'
This prohibition of discrimination in credit extension on the basis
of sex is long overdue. There is no justification in modem society to
treat women as inferior in any area of human interaction. It is sad
to realize that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is not yet the law,'72
and that it was introduced as late as 1973. Again, wisdom is late
in coming.
PART FIVE
FUENTES AND THE ILLINOIS REPLEVIN STATUTE
Creditors' default remedies have recently become subject to
numerous constitutional challenges. In particular, the remedy grant-
166. Id. § 106.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 201.
169. Id. § 208.
170. Id. 88 301-302.
171. Id. § 302.
172. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act will become effective 60 days after final
enactment, provided the House accepts the version passed by the Senate.
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ing a creditor the right of summary seizure of property without an
opportunity for hearing or notice has been challenged on fourteenth
amendment due process grounds, as discussed in Part One. 171 Such
constitutional deficiencies as lack of notice and opportunity to be
heard, wrongful deprivation of a vendee's property interest between
the time of the vendor's taking possession and entry of final judg-
ment, and the lack of an overriding governmental or public interest
justifying the exercise of state involvement in summary seizure, must
be considered in analyzing the constitutional challenge to summary
seizure of property. This discussion deals not with self-help seizure,
but rather with seizures pursuant to a judicial writ of replevin.
The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin174 held that prejudgment
replevin proceedings violate the fourteenth amendment's flexible due
process requirements of notice and hearing. In the wake of the
Court's pronouncement, analagous replevin procedures in 39 states,
including Illinois, were in need of amendment to conform to the
constitutional mandate of Fuentes.'
173. See discussion in Part I of this Article, supra.
174. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
175. The following jurisdictions had provisions for prejudgment recovery of
chattel prior to Fuentes: ALA CODE tit. 9, §§ 93-97 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 88
(1968); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1301 to -1302 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34-2101 to -2104 (1962); CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. §§ 509-512 (West 1967); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-515 to -531 (1960); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-3701
(1966); IDAHO CODE §H 8-301 to -312 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-27
(Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-2701 to -2713 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 643.10 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1005 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 425.120
(Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7301 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 247, § 7 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.7309 (1962); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 565.01 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2841 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
533.010 to -.230 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-4101 (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-1093 to -10,110 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 31840 (Supp. 1971);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 536:1 to 536:8 (1955); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:59-1 (Supp.
1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-17-1 to -17-21 (1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-472 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07-01 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE Am. § 2737.01 (Anderson
1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1571 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 29.810 (1969);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-21-1 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2501 (1962);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-15-1 to -15-8 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
2301 et seq. (1956); UTAH R. Civ. P. 64B (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12-5371
(1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.64.010 et seq. (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 265.01 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. CODE CIV. P. §§ 1-693 to -707 (1957); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 211 (1967). Shortly after the decision in Fuentes the Ten-
nessee replevin statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2301 to -2328 (1956) was declared
unconstitutional insofar as they authorized a deprivation of property without the
right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels were taken from their pos-
sessor. See Mitchell v. State, 351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
[Vol. 23:98
CONSUMER PROTECTION
In light of those developments, an examination of the decision in
Fuentes with a view toward understanding its place in the development
of procedural due process standards, and a look at the relative
compliance of the recent Illinois Amendment to its replevin statute
with the constitutional mandate of Fuentes follows.
In Fuentes,'76 the Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of two
federal district courts which had upheld the constitutionality of the
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin laws. 177  These statutes author-
ized summary seizure by ex parte application for a writ of replevin.
One appellant, Mrs. Fuentes, had purchased a gas stove and stereo
phonograph pursuant to a conditional sales contract with accompany-
ing service policies from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.
The seller retained title to the goods and was given the right by con-
tract to repossess the merchandise in the event the purchaser de-
faulted in any of her payments. For over a year, Mrs. Fuentes re-
mitted her payments until a dispute arose over the quality of the
stove. She then defaulted on her stove payments, but paid the re-
maining balance due on the stereo. This latter payment was treated
by the retailer as a pre-payment on the entire contract and the non-
payment was treated as a default on the entire contract. The seller
subsequently obtained from the clerk of the court a writ of replevin
and the merchandise was summarily seized from her home by the
local sheriff. There was no question about state action under these
circumstances.
The writ of replevin was obtained by Firestone in a small claims
action merely by claiming its right to possession of the disputed prop-
erty and posting a security bond. Under the Florida statute, 178 no-
tice of replevin was sent to the debtor who received it. The default-
ing purchaser had an opportunity for a hearing only after the goods
had been seized and could recover the goods before the hearing only
by filing a security bond equal to double the value of the item. The
176. The factual background reported here is drawn from the Supreme Court
opinion, 407 U.S. 67, 70-73 (1972), and the district court opinion, Fuentes v. Fair-
cloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
177. The first case that the Court reviewed was Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970). The other case consolidated for review by the Court
was Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
178. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, 78.07, 78.10, 78.13 (Supp. 1972).
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Pennsylvania statute, while varying slightly, was nearly the same as
Florida's. 170
The Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes, moreover, were
similar to the then existing Illinois statutory scheme.'8 0 The Illi-
nois statute merely required the plaintiff to file a verified complaint
which states that the complainant is the owner of the described prop-
erty and that such property is wrongfully retained by the defend-
ant.181
When executed, the ex parte application for replevin resulted in
the vendees' dispossession of the chattel without any prior hearing
to determine probable cause for the issuance of the writ of replevin.
Following the application under the pre-Fuentes Illinois procedure,
a writ was issued to the sheriff, 182 directing him to deliver the prop-
erty to the plaintiff.) 88  After issuance of the writ the plaintiff was
required to post a security bond. The notice of the replevin was re-
ceived by the debtor simultaneously with the taking, as authorized
by the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes.
Therefore, the issue before the Fuentes court was whether such
statutory schemes typified by the Illinois replevin statute violated due
process. As the Supreme Court viewed the issue, Fuentes pre-
sented the question of "whether procedural due process . . . requires
an opportunity for a hearing before the state authorizes its agents to
seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of
another."' 4  The Court essentially concluded that the right to a
179. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1821 (Supp. 1972); PA. R. Cv. P. 1073, 1076, 1077.
The Pennsylvania law did not require an opportunity for a hearing. The creditor
was only required to (1) file an affidavit of value for the property sought to be
replevied, (2) execute an ex parte application, and (3) post a bond for twice the
value of the property sought to be replevied. The writ was executed by summary
seizure without notice or hearing on the issue of possession.
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 8-26 (1971).
181. Id. § 4.
182. Id. § 6.
183. Id. § 7. The writ of replevin required the sheriff, or other officer to
whom the writ was directed, to take the property from the possession of the de-
fendant and deliver it to the plaintiff unless the defendant executed a bond and se-
curity as provided in the statute. This action on the writ summoned the defendant
to answer to the plaintiff in the action, or in the event that the property was not
found and delivered to the sheriff or other officer, to answer to the plaintiff for
the value of the same.
184. 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
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hearing before property was taken under color of state law was a
basic principle of due process, and then said that "[t]he Florida
and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes fly in the face of this
principle."' 80
Initially, the Fuentes Court, defined the nature of the property
interests deserving fourteenth amendment protection. It made clear
that the Constitutional protection extends to all types of property,
not merely property deemed "necessities,"-a distinction seemingly
drawn in previous decisions. Indeed, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.'86 and Goldberg v. Kelly'87 may be interpreted to say that a
due process violation depends in part on the type of property subject
to summary seizure.
In Sniadach, a creditor had obtained a prejudgment wage garnish-
ment against the debtor's wages under a Wisconsin procedure which
made no provision for notice and hearing before the garnishment order
was executed.' 8 The effect of the garnishment was to "freeze" the
debtor's wages while the creditor pursued his action on the debt. The
Court held that the freezing of these wages deprived the defendant
of due process, since no notice or hearing was provided.
It would appear that the broad principle set forth in Sniadach
would be applicable to any state-involved deprivation of property,
subject to scrutiny on due process. The Court, however, expressly
noted the deleterious effects of wage garnishments, viewing one's
wages as a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system. 189 That certain property interests deemed
"necessities" were alone protected by the Constitution seemed to be
amplified by the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly.' 90 In Goldberg, the
Court held that due process requires that welfare recipients be given
an evidentiary hearing before the termination of public assistance
benefits. However, Goldberg, like Sniadach, left the impression that
welfare payments, too, were a specialized type of property, perpet-
185. 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972).
186. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
187. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
188. WIs. STAT. § 265.01 (1957).
189. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
190. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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tuating the negative inference that non-specialized property taken
under color of state law may not involve due process violations.
After Sniadach and Goldberg the lower courts had to consider
whether the Supreme Court had made the due process clause gen-
erally applicable to summary seizure of any type of property or appli-
cable only to those takings which involved specialized types of prop-
erty deemed necessities, the taking of which would pose a special
hardship. There ensued a division of opinion on this issue in the
lower courts.191
The issue was finally resolved when the Supreme Court in Fuentes
laid to rest the "necessities" distinction by rejecting the narrow in-
terpretations of Sniadach and Goldberg. The Court stated:
No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance" or "neces-
sity" of various consumer goods. Stoves could be compared to television
sets, or beds could be compared to tables. But if the root principle of pro-
cedural due process is to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such
distinctions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally.
And, under our free enterprise system, an individual's choices in the mar-
ketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to someone else.
It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make
its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that,
by its own lights, are "necessary."' 9 2
Not only did the Court adopt the broader interpretation of Sniadach,
it also placed the right of prior hearing so firmly on due process
grounds that any purported exception or justification for deprivation
of the right to a hearing would have to be of great magnitude to be
sanctioned by the Court. Indeed, the Court went on to reiterate
191. In the wake of Sniadach, many courts adopted the broader interpretation,
finding the due process clause generally applicable to all summary takings of prop-
erty. See, e.g., Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v.
Appellate Department of Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971); Larson v.
Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
But, on the other hand, many other jurisdictions adopted the more narrow view
of Sniadach, determining that the due process clause was applicable only to takings
of some distinct kinds of property-takings which would work an extreme hardship.
The Court's reasoning was not extended to summary replevin actions. See, e.g.,
Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011, 1015-16 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Blackwatch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American
Olean Title Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v.
Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court of Mari-
copa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); 300 W. 154th St. Realty Co. v.
Dep't of Buildings, 26 N.Y. 538, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970).
192. 407 U.S. 67, 89-90 (1972).
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earlier justifications for departures from strict compliance with min-
imal due process requirements. These included: attachment of
property to secure a judgment in a state court,19 3 seizure of property
to collect federal taxes,19 4 seizure of misbranded drugs' 95 and seiz-
ure of contaminated food.19 6
More generally, the Court reiterated its "exceptional circum-
stance" principle validating a legitimate non-due process exercise
of a states' seizure power; to wit, where it is necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest, or where a special
need for very prompt action can be shown.'97
The Court next rejected the argument that the appellants lacked
legal title to goods because they made their purchases under condi-
tional sales contracts. The Court noted that a property interest pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment has never been interpreted to
safeguard the rights of only those having undisputed ownership. In-
deed, the use and possession of property pursuant to a contract
was deemed a sufficient possessory interest deserving of protection
of the due process clause.198
Next, the Court held that it made no difference that the taking of
property under a prejudgment writ of replevin might only be tem-
porary or that the party deprived of the property could recover it by
later posting a bond. Even a temporary taking of property is a "dep-
rivation" in fourteenth amendment terms.' 9 9 The Court added that
the length and severity of a deprivation were factors, however, in de-
termining the appropriate form of the hearing, but in no case was it
decisive of the basic right. °0
Further, the Court found that: the statutes served no important
governmental or general public interest in allowing summary seizure
when only private gain was directly at stake; the takings were not
limited to situations which demanded prompt action; and no mean-
193. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
194. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
195. Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
196. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1909).
197. 407 U.S. at 91.
198. Id. at 86-87.
199. Id. at 84-85.
200. Id. at 86.
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ingful standards were enunciated through which the state exercised
its control. Private parties serving their own interests would uni-
laterally invoke state power to redeem goods from another. 10' Fur-
ther, no meaningful forum for the evaluation of the merits of the
allegation of the complainant was provided. Hence, the replevin stat-
utes were constitutionally defective for not providing effective con-
trol over the state monoply of legitimate force.
The Court lastly considered whether the signing of a conditional
sales contract containing language providing for the seller's repos-
session upon the buyer's default constituted an effective waiver of
due process rights. The Court, citing D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v.
Frick Co.,2"2 acknowledged that due process rights may be contrac-
tually waived, if the waiver is voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly
made. The Court indicated that in determining whether due process
rights have been waived, it will look to the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case.
The effect of Fuentes on state prejudgment replevin statutes is
far reaching. Of the 48 states having some form of prejudgment
replevin statute, the validity of some 39 state statutes was called into
serious question by the Fuentes decision.203
The direct consequence of Fuentes v. Shevin in Illinois, initially,
was to question the validity of the Illinois summary repossession pro-
visions, (sections 4 through 7) which failed to require hearings prior
to repossession. 204  Shortly after Fuentes was decided, the Cook
County Circuit Court entered an order prohibiting the issuance of
writs of replevin. °  In the interim period, the General Assembly
201. Id. at 91.
202. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
203. See discussion at note 175, supra.
204. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 4-7 (1971).
205. On the basis of the Fuentes decision, the Circuit Court of Cook County
added the following paragraph to the general orders which deal with replevin actions:
REPLEVIN AND GARNISHMENT ACTIONS
(a) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall not accept
actions in replevin for filing and shall not issue writs of replevin.
(b) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall not accept
an affidavit for a non-wage garnishment and shall refuse to issue summons
in such proceeding based upon a judgment by confession unless such judg-
ment is confirmed after service of process.
GENERAL ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, § 6.4 (Aug. 24, 1972).
In connection with the order, the office of the state's attorney issued an opinion
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considered numerous amendment proposals to the replevin statute.
One such amendatory bill was enacted on August 13, 1973.206
The legislature's amendments essentially bring Illinois replevin pro-
cedure into compliance with the mandate of Fuentes. The basic
mandate of Fuentes is that the person in possession of goods sought
to be replevied should be given the opportunity to contest the is-
suance of the writ at a hearing scheduled before the writ is issued.
This requirement expresses itself in the notion of notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard, and is implemented through section 4(a) of the
amendment, requiring a five-day notice of a hearing to contest the
issuance of the writ.20 7
An action in replevin is commenced by filing a verified complaint
which: describes the property to be replevied; states that the plaintiff
in the action is the owner of the property so described; declares that
the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant; and states that
the property has not been taken pursuant to the legitimate exercise
of governmental power.208 Such information must be provided in
the verified complaint in order for the defendant to receive adequate
notice of the issues which will be heard, thus giving such defendant
the opportunity to test the factual basis of allegations underlying any
claim to possession. In short, the requirement of notice prior to
hearing appears to be in accordance with the Court's mandate in
Fuentes.
Recall that the Court noted there could be "extraordinary situa-
tions" which would justify postponing the notice and opportunity for
hearing, but indicated that these situations must be truly unusual.
addressed to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, which includes the
following:
[T]he strong language of both the Scott and Fuentes cases leads to the
inescapable conclusion that non-wage garnishments without prior notice and
an opportunity for a hearing are no longer legally permissible. These re-
cent cases are illustrative of judicial interest in affording notice and an
opportunity for hearing prior to depriving an individual of his property.
It is my opinion that your office refuse to accept affidavits for non-wage
garnishments and you should further refuse to issue summons in such
proceedings based upon judgments by mere confession.
State's Attorney Legal Opinion, No. 1425.
206. P.A. 78-287, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (effective August 13, 1973),
amending ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 119, §§ 1-21 (1971).
207. P.A. 78-287, § 4(a).
208. P.A. 78-287, § 4.
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Under the revised Act, such extraordinary situations have been cod-
ified in section 4(b) of the amendment.209 The Fuentes Court
suggested that cases in which a creditor could show immediate dan-
ger of a debtor destroying or concealing disputed goods might justify
seizure before notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Thus, the
replevin amendment allows summary seizure where there is imme-
diate impending harm resulting from: imminent removal of the dis-
puted property from the state; the perishable nature of the disputed
property; imminent sale, transfer or assignment of the disputed
property, such transaction being fraudulent or in derogation of plain-
tiff's rights in the property; and where a defendant has obtained pos-
session by theft.21 0 The notion of exceptional circumstances jus-
tifying summary seizure has been long codified in Illinois' attach-
ment statute. 1' These standards for summary seizure appear to
comply with Fuentes, where the statutory structure was struck down
for not enunciating meaningful standards through which the state
exercised its control over replevin proceedings. The Court indicated,
however, if effective control could be exercised through the setting
forth of meaningful standards, summary seizure by the state could
be sanctioned in justifiable instances. The Court added that the
need for prompt action exhibited in the "exceptional circumstances
doctrine" could be grounds for the valid exercise of state control
in summary seizure situations. The standards for summary seizure
are drawn with such particularity in the Illinois replevin amendment
that it obviates any argument that it is overly broad or lacking in
meaningful standards.
One of the weaknesses of the Fuentes opinion is the lack of direc-
tion concerning the form and nature of a probable cause hearing re-
quired prior to the issuance of a writ of replevin. The Court did not
indicate the form that the hearing would have to take, stating that
the question was now appropriate for legislation, not adjudication.
The decision did, however, contain a few clues regarding the form of
hearing required.
Initially, the Court talked of a flexible standard, indicating that
due process is a variable concept, dependent on the nature of the
209. P.A. 78-287, § 4(b).
210. P.A. 78-287, § 4(b).
211. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 1 et seq. (1971).
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case.112 They stated that the hearing must consider "the importance
of the interests involved, 213 matters such as the length and severity
of the deprivation,214 and the simplicity of the decisiveness. 215
While noting that the form of the hearing could be legitimately open
to many potential variations, the Court cautioned that the hearing
must be aimed at "establishing the validity, or at least the probable
validity, of the underlying claim of the party seeking the writ of re-
plevin. ' 216
Illinois legislative action structured and clarified the form of the
replevin hearing. Under the revised Illinois replevin statute, there
is ample opportunity for the allegations of the particular parties to
be examined. Initially, one may appear in an ex parte hearing to
determine the issue of whether notice is required or whether there is
an effective waiver. At the hearing the court examines the evidence
on each element required by the section, providing an initial op-
portunity for the court to review any claim to the right to immediate
repossession.
A second hearing is provided on the issuance of the writ of re-
plevin-arising either from a contest on the issue of notice or by an
ex parte hearing pursuant to a determination in the first hearing that
notice is not required or a valid waiver of right was executed. In
either case, at this second hearing evidence must be presented estab-
lishing a superior right to possession. Clearly, there is ample oppor-
tunity in such proceedings for a court to review the surrounding cir-
cumstances in each case. Clearly, the revised Illinois procedure is
in accord with the flexible notions of due process. The hearing must
have a distinct focal point, as noted by the Court in Fuentes. Al-
though the hearing is not a trial on the merits, there is the require-
ment in Illinois that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case to a su-
perior right to possession of the disputed property. The plaintiff must
also demonstrate to the court the probability that he will ultimately
prevail on the underlying claim to possession. 21 7  Therefore, the
212. 407 U.S. at 82.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 86.
215. Id. at 87 n.18.
216. Id. at 97...
217. P.A. 78-287, § 4(6).
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plaintiff must establish the validity of his underlying claim to supe-
rior possessory interest before a writ may issue.
Some duplication of effort may be required in introducing evi-
dence on the merits of the basic claim when the underlying case is
litigated, but the protection afforded the individual through a fair
hearing before issuance of the writ counterbalances such concern.
Likewise, appropriate steps can be taken by the judiciary to mini-
mize this duplication. In many cases, the defendant may forego the
opportunity of further litigation, while in others, it may be possible
to have the evidence presented at the full trial. Nevertheless, the
safeguard afforded through a full hearing on the underlying claim
outweighs any claim to duplication of effort.
The Fuentes decision was disappointing in that it did not delineate
the relative rights of the creditor and debtor to procedural safe-
guards at such pre-writ hearings. This weakness appears to be re-
flected in the Illinois replevin amendment, ultimately leaving ques-
tions unanswered under the Illinois statute, such as what defenses
may be raised by the debtor at the hearing since the proceeding is
not a trial on the merits.
Finally, the Supreme Court discussed the question of whether the
defendant could contractually waive his right to prior notice and
hearing. The Court, citing D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co.,"'8
acknowledged that due process rights may be contractually waived
if the waiver is voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given. The
question ultimately concerns what constitutes such a valid waiver,
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given.
For instance, the Court in Fuentes indicated that many factors
may interfere with the tendering of a valid waiver. The absence of
the actually bargained-for contractual terms, the purchaser's relative
disadvantage in bargaining position, a showing that the weaker con-
tracting party had no awareness of the significance of waiver, are
all factors suggesting substantial doubt as to whether a properly
worded waiver would be enforceable against a party to an "adhe-
sion contract."
Certain Illinois court decisions have indulged in the presumption
against the waiver of constitutional rights in such circumstances.
218. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See P.A. 72-287, § 4(a).
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For example, in Scott v. Danaher,19 the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois suggested that whether the execu-
tion of a cognovit clause in a promissory note amounts to an inde-
pendent and voluntary waiver of the debtor's constitutional right to
notice of hearing upon the subsequent confession of judgment, is a
question to be decided upon the facts of the particular case. Such
factors as the debtor's intelligence, state of mind and bargaining
power all play a part in the determination.
The Illinois replevin amendment codified the inherent presump-
tion against the waiver of constitutional rights by one in a relatively
disadvantageous bargaining position. Section 4(a) provides that the
right to notice and hearing may not be waived by any consumer, a
"consumer" being defined as an individual who obtained possession
of property for personal, family, household or agricultural pur-
poses. 220  With respect to those in an equal bargaining position, a
waiver is allowed provided the safeguards mentioned by the Court
are followed.
It must be noted that the Illinois legislature has not only complied
with the mandate of Fuentes, but may have gone beyond the Court's
message in recognizing that a consumer may, in fact, be unable to ex-
ecute a valid waiver.
The Fuentes decision, although directly affecting only replevin
statutes, might arguably be applied in other contexts. Clearly the
Fuentes decision has left other summary remedies of relief in Illinois
subject to constitutional attack.
In Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corporation,22' the federal district
court held that the Illinois Innkeeper Laws, authorizing a hotel pro-
prietor to seize property without any notice or hearing, were uncon-
stitutional. The court reasoned that since the hotel guests were not
granted a hearing at which to contest the underlying claim, they
were denied due process. As a result, other statutory lien remedies
in Illinois, which similarly do not provide for a hearing or notice be-
fore the lien attaches, may be constitutionally defective.
One important area not specifically dealt with by the Fuentes de-
cision concerns non-judicial repossession of goods as authorized by
219. 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1277-78 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
220. P.A. 78-287, § 4(a).
221. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 111. 1972).
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section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While it has been
argued that the Fuentes decision makes such self-help repossessions
unconstitutional as discussed in Part One of this article, self-help runs
into the section 1983 roadblock requirement that the constitutional
deprivation take place under the "color of state law."2"2
The efficacy of declaring unconstitutional the summary replevin
practices, will ultimately be judged by evaluating the practical con-
sequences flowing from the decision. Mr. Justice White's dissenting
refrain in Fuentes-that every additional protection gained by con-
sumers will be reflected in one way or another in increased costs for
goods, services, or credits-must be answered. This concession to
economic reality has formed the basis of much of the criticism of
recent consumer protection developments. The critics of such con-
sumer developments pose the argument that the availability of
consumer credit, especially for low income consumers may rapidly
decline since the creditor's security also will have been diminished.
This argument may be countered on several bases. Evidence sug-
gesting that, finance companies and banks would cease loaning to
credit risks if such safeguards were instituted is speculative, at best.
A recent article sets forth an empirical survey of banks and retail
establishments. The data suggests that the Fuentes safeguards will
have little impact on the credit market behavior.
An analysis of these overall results indicates that there is no need for
the credit market to be unduly concerned with the possible effects of Fuentes
and Adams. Default occurs in only a small percentage of total loans made.
Creditors stated that in many of these defaults repossession as a collection
remedy is not feasible and in those few defaults where repossession is
feasible, the vast majority of debtors will voluntarily give up the collateral.
This greatly diminishes the number of defaults where involuntary repos-
session is an important collection remedy. Thus, Fuentes and Adams will
affect only a minute portion of the credit markets' transactions.223
The point is that Fuentes may not be as far-reaching in the real
world as in the legal world. On the other hand, it is the very essence
of due process that time be taken to consider any objections which
222. See discussion in Part I of this Article, supra.
223. Krahmer, Clifford and Casley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 23, 62 (1972),
cited in, Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession By Secured Creditors Under




might be made to the exercise of state power over the liberty or prop-
erty of an individual before that power is exercised. Further, these
safeguards will provide meaningful standards through which the
state may exercise its legitimate summary replevin remedies. No
longer are self-serving creditors allowed unilaterally to invoke state
power to seize goods by replevin from a consumer. In the last
analysis of the real benefit of Fuentes is its support of the system
of due process of law-the curtailment of state authoritative, monop-
oly power vis-a-vis the consumer in behalf of the creditor. It is less
important that consumers, as a class, will not benefit economically
than the fact that consumers, as a collective group, will benefit po-
litically. In this sense Fuentes is a decision in the conservative
Burkenian tradition.
PART SIX
PROPOSED FTC TRADE REGULATION RULE RELATING TO PRESERVATION
OF BUYERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES IN CONSUMER
INSTALLMENT AND CREDIT CARD SALES
On January 26, 1971, the Federal Trade Commission, pursuant
to its enabling act and rules of practice,224 issued a proposed trade
regulation rule concerning the preservation of buyers' claims and de-
fenses in consumer installment sales. Hearings were held in Chi-
cago, Washington and New York during 1971.225
As a result of testimony received at these hearings, the Commis-
sion subsequently issued a revised proposed rule on January 5, 1973,
and announced a new round of public hearings.226 The proposed re-
vised rule2 27 would permit a consumer to defend his non-payment
of installments allegedly due to a merchant or creditor when the
merchandise or services obtained in an installment sale or financed
by a "related creditor" prove unsatisfactory and the merchant offers
no acceptable cure.
As such, the proposed rule represents a further extension of the
close-connection doctrine which was born over thirty years ago in the
224. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11 et seq. (1973).
225. See 36 Fed. Reg. 7865 (1971).
226. Section 433.1, 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973).
227. The proposed rule, if approved, will be cited as 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1973).
See Comment, Providing Consumer Relief from Disclaimers, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 794,
804-06 (1972).
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Arkansas case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,22 and which
was reinforced in the New Jersey case of UNICO v. Owen229 in 1967.
The close-connection rationale works to limit the operation of the
holder-in-due course doctrine when consumer-obligation paper is as-
signed and/or negotiated. The following should serve as a repre-
sentative transaction.
Ben Taken goes to Lemon Motors and purchases a new car pur-
suant to a retail installment sales contract which Taken executes.
Taken also signs a promissory note made payable to the order of Lem-
on Motors. A day or two later, Lemon Motors discounts these obli-
gations, which the Uniform Commercial Code designates as "chattel
paper, ' '230 to Friendly Bank. The bank notifies Ben Taken (the
obligor of the paper and account-debtor under Article Nine of the
UCC)281 of the assignment (discount). Incidentally, one can easily
see why Friendly Bank may desire to purchase the consumer paper
from the dealer rather than make a direct consumer loan since the
bank, by purchasing the obligation at a pre-determined discount
(so many percentage points off the total installment obligation or the
face of the paper), in effect raises its yield in many cases far above
what usury and small loan statutes would permit. 232  In any event,
the purchase of a dealer's retail paper is economically attractive.
Until recently, such a purchase has been legally attractive as well.
Shortly after the sale, Ben Taken's new car fails to run properly,
and subsequently he takes the car back to Lemon Motors which refuses
to honor its warranty. Under these circumstances Taken naturally
considers his "remedy" to be to withhold further payments until the
dealer satisfactorily fixes the car. However, Ben Taken now owes
his payment obligation to Friendly Bank which will inform Ben
that any defense to payment which he could have raised against the
dealer, Lemon Motors, cannot be raised against Friendly Bank.
228. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
229. 50 N.J. 101, 223 A.2d 405 (1967).
230. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1)(b) (1972 Official Text) [herein-
after cited as UCCI.
231. UCC § 9-105(1)(a).
232. For example, if an installment price is based on a twelve percent annual
percentage rate calculated as the declining balance of the obligation, then the bank
can purchase this obligation at ten points off its face, the effective yield could go as
high as twenty percent.
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The Bank, in short, claims to be a holder in due course (HDC) of
Taken's promissory note,23 3 and also to have the rights of an HDC,
even under the retail installment contract since the latter contained a
"waiver of defense clause" whereby the obligor waived the right
to raise those defenses assertable against the assignor as against any
assignee of the paper.2"' So Ben Taken's only real economic lev-
erage to persuade Lemon Motors to honor its legal obligations has
been destroyed by operation of law (the HDC doctrine).
Moreover, section 9-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code oper-
ates in such fashion as to expand the HDC defense in the transfer of
consumer obligations.235 Recall that the rights afforded a holder in
due course under section 3-305 apply only in the case of a negotiable
obligation, the requirements for which are set out in detail in sec-
tions 3-104 through 3-111.236 (Chattel paper as defined by the
Code237 can never meet the Article Three prerequisites for nego-
tiability since such obligations on their face contain promises other
than the buyers' promise to pay a sum certain). So, chattel paper
transferee can never claim to be a HDC. But, if the transferor ear-
lier agreed with the obligor (consumer) that any subsequent trans-
feree could have the same rights as if the transferree were an HDC,
then "freedom of contract" will validate a private law extension of
a limited commercial paper doctrine. That is how the law developed,
and, of course, the UCC gave this extension its blessing.2 38 Sur-
233. UCC § 3-305.
234. See UCC § 9-206.
235. UCC § 9-206 Agreement Not to Assert Defenses Against Assignee; Mod-
ification of Sales Warranties Where Security Agreement Exists
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee
that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he
may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim
or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against
a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on
Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such
an agreement.
236. UCC § 3-104 to 3-111.
237. "A writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a se-
curity interest in or lease of specific goods." UCC § 9-105 (1)(b).
238. See note 235, supra.
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prisingly, it made such an extension presumptive by reason of the
last sentence of section 9-206.239
The arguments for expansion of the HDC status in transferring
commercial obligations is that such transferee protection is neces-
sary to make such obligations marketable in the first place. How-
ever, that argument amounts to overkill. Since, (1) banks and fi-
nance companies will continue to buy high yield chattel pa-
per, (2) the financial institutions can continue to protect themselves
by being selective in purchasing consumer obligations (covert su-
pervision over merchants) and (3) buying such that retains full re-
course rights against the dealer-transferor should the obligor default
for any reason. 40 It is against this background of total transferee
protection that the pendulum began to swing back in the Childs
case24' and gain momentum in the 1967 UNICO case.242
In UNICO, the defendants, lured by a newspaper advertisement ad-
vertising a free stereo, agreed to purchase 140 record albums for
$698 which paid for the records and for a "free" stereo. The pur-
chasers signed a retail installment contract and note in their home.
Total payments came to over $800. The same day the paper was
executed it was assigned to Unico by the seller, Universal Stereo
Corp. The Owens' ultimately received the stereo, but only twelve
records. They subsequently withheld further payments and the as-
signee, UNICO, filed suit. UNICO pointed to a waiver of defense
clause in the contract executed by the Owens and also claimed to an
HDC of their note.
The New Jersey Supreme Court looked carefully at all the facts
surrounding the sale and assignment and concluded that there was
such an intimate, close relationship between Universal and UNICO
that the latter would be subject to the defenses assertable against
the former. 243  The court viewed its decisional task as one of bal-
239. Id.
240. The purchasers of consumer paper by having and using full recourse
rights against the assignor-merchant places pressure on the merchant to honor its
obligations and to fully perform all consideration owing under the retail contracts,
the payment rights of which have been assigned.
241. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).




ancing the need to protect consumers against the commercial need
to protect negotiability and marketability of commercial paper.
Upon viewing the "intimate" relationship between the assignor and
assignee of the Owens' obligation, the court concluded that in the
case of such intimacy public policy requires that the waiver of de-
fense claim be inoperative in the retail installment contract, and that
moreover, the close-connection raised an inference of bad faith
in the negotiation of the note so that UNICO could not claim to be an
HDC of the instrument, having not observed the section 3-104 good
faith transfer standard.244
The case was warmly received by consumer advocates but there
remained one difficulty to its serving as a model for other courts-
the facts were strongly against the assignee, that is, the close-connec-
tion was overwhelming. Consider that (1) Universal created and
formed UNICO, (2) Ownershipwise, UNICO was tied to Universal,
(3) UNICO was formed for the sole and specific purpose of financing
Universal, (4) UNICO drafted and furnished Universal with the re-
tail contracts and promissory notes, (5) UNICO's name as indorsee
was printed on the back of the promissory notes, (6) UNICO's name
as assignee was printed on the retail installment contracts, (7) UNICO
exercised considerable control over Universal through credit checks,
inventory control, etc., (8) UNICO was Universal's inventory financer
in addition to financing all of its retail sales and (9) UNICO had a
thorough knowledge of Universal's business practices. Indeed, given
these facts, the two firms can be said to have merged. Unfortunately
this constitutes the one problem with the UNICO case-it can usually
be distinguished since rarely would such a "merger" be present in
typical consumer paper assignments and purchases.
Nonetheless, the close-connection doctrine gained acceptance and
many courts2 45 and several state legislatures 246 reacted by relying on
244. UCC § 3-104.
245. Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950); Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. 1968); Inter-
national Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965); American
Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 866 (1968).
246. As of September 1, 1972, sixteen jurisdictions have eliminted by statute the
effective use of waiver of defense clauses in consumer transactions. The statutes
include: ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 320(a) (Supp. 1971); ALASKA STAT. §8 45.10.140,
150 (1962); § 45.50.541(b) (Sbpp. 1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.1(a), 1804.2,
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and enacting a close-connection rule. The citadel of HDC doctrine
as to consumer credit transactions soon came under full attack.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code came along and in section
2.403,247 prohibited the use of negotiable instruments (other than
checks) in a consumer transaction. Moreover section 2.404248
would either prohibit outright, or alternatively, restrict the operation
of, a waiver of defense clause. Illinois has not enacted the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code.
Despite all the court challenges to the HDC citadel and despite all
the new statutory restrictions on waiver of defense clauses as typified
by section 2.404 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, a serious
"loophole" remains, as discussed in a marvellous article by Professor
Neil 0. Littlefield.24 As Professor Littlefield points out, "there is
no reason why dealers and finance companies are wedded to trans-
actions in which the finance agency becomes either the transferree of
a promisory note or the assignee of an installment contract. 250
He notes that the practice of setting up consumer loans separate
2983.5, 2983.7(a) (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-403(2) (Supp.
1971) (part of the Colo. UCCC); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3808(a) (Supp. V, 1972);
HAWAII REV. LAWS §H 476-18(b), (d) (1968); IDAHO CODE § 28-32-404(1)(a)
(Supp. 1971) (part of Idaho UCCC); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, H8 10
(6), 25A, ch. 255B, § 19A (Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.416(11)(f), as
amended, § 19.417(207)(2), as amended, effective January 1, 1973, § 23.628
(14)(f) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. §H 325.941(2)(a), (3) (Supp. 1971); NEV.
REV. STAT. H3 97.275(1), (2) (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-1.2, as added by
Laws 1972; § 17:16C-64.1 (1970); OREGON LAWS 1972, ch. 744, § 2(2); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 70B-2-403 (Supp. 1971) (part of the Utah UCCC); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 2455 (1970); WASH. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-404(1) (Supp. 1971).
247. Section 2.403. Certain Negotiable Instruments Prohibited
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease
primarily for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may not take a
negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation of
the buyer or lessee. A holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable
instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this section. A holder
in due course is not subject to the liabilities set forth in the provisions on
the effect of violations on rights of parties (Section 5.202) and the pro-
visions on civil actions by Administrator (Section 6.113).
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1969 Official Text).
248. Section 2.404 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code contains two alterna-
tives. Alternative A simply makes an assignee subject to all claims and defenses
of the buyer against the seller available to the consumer obligor. Alternative B,
however, in essence places a three-month limitation on the obligor's right to raise
defenses. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404 (1969 Official Text).
249. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the
New UCCC, 44 N.Y.L REv. 272 (1969).
250. Id. at 292.
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from consumer credit sales is on the increase, citing a 1968 Wisconsin
Law Review project in support.' 5 The point is simple but dramatic
-take away the protected status of an assignee financer and they
will begin to make only direct consumer loans. This will encourage
sellers to demand a cash price for the goods sold. However, rec-
ognizing the financial impossibility of obtaining such a cash price,
sellers just prior to the sale consummation will direct (refer) the pur-
chaser to a nearby neighborhood financial institution to obtain a
loan. The bank or financial institution will probably pay the pro-
ceeds of the loan directly to the seller-merchant, to enable the bank
to have a non-seller's purchase money security interest in the con-
sumer goods financed.252 Note that in such sale-loan situations, the
"form" of the consumer credit transaction is changed from a consumer
credit sale and subsequent assignment to a financer, to a direct con-
sumer loan from the financer with the loan proceeds made payable
to the merchant so that the sale of goods becomes a "cash" sale.
Professor Littlefield in his 1969 article suggests a method to plug
this loophole. He would allow a consumer's claims and defenses
arising out of the sale of goods to be assertable against the direct
lender in cases where the transaction is "interlocking," that is, where
the sale and loan transactions are closely related. 5
Professor Littlefield's suggestion was quickly seized upon by con-
sumer proponents throughout the country, especially by the compe-
tent National Consumer Law Center connected with Boston Uni-
versity which drafted its own variation of a proposed statute to cover
interlocking sales and services in its proposed model National Con-
sumer Act (NCA). In a section entitled "Interlocking Loans and
Sales,' 254 the NCA proscribes that a creditor "shall be subject to all
of the claims and defenses of the consumer" to the amount financed
in a consumer loan transaction if the loan and sale are interlocking. 255
The Act goes on to list seven "relationships" which are deemed to
251. Id. at 293 n.77.
252. See UCC § 9-107.
253. Littlefield, supra note 249, at 293-97. See also Littlefield, Preservation of
Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and Credit Card Transactions-Recent
Statutes, Policies and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 471.
254. NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 2.407.
255. Id.
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make a transaction an interlocking one so that the rule of "subject
to all defenses" becomes applicable, to wit:
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the creditor partici-
pates in or is connected with a consumer sale or lease transaction when:
(a) the creditor is a person related to the seller or lessor; or
(b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in connection with
the loan; or
(c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor used by the
consumer in obtaining the loan; or
(d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar year, the
proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or lessor,
or with a person related to the same seller or lessor; or
(e) the consumer if referred to the creditor by the seller or lessor; or
(f) the creditor, directly or indirectly, pays the seller or lessor any
consideration whether or not it is in connection with the particular trans-
action; or
(g) the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by
the consumer in the consumer sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement
between the issuer and the seller. 2 5 6
The items which most upset the credit industry are subparagraphs
(d), (e) and (). The loud cry that the NCA provision would kill
consumer credit, especially in communities with only a few money
suppliers making consumer loans. If one believes the NCA has
gone too far the proposed Federal Trade Commission rule reaches
a zenith in perplexity.
The revised proposed FTC rule declares that it is a deceptive and
unfair trade practice for a retail seller to obtain a note or instrument
and fail to have inscribed upon the face of said note or instrument
a statement indicating that any holder of the note, instrument or
other writing evidencing a consumer debt takes subject to all the
claims of the maker (consumer) on the contract under which the
debt arose.5  Moreover, the proposed rule also declares it to be
a deceptive practice for a retail seller to engage in any consumer sale
transaction financed by a related creditor unless the financing ar-
rangements between the consumer and the related creditor permit
the consumer to "maintain against the related creditor any claims or
defense arising out of the consumer transaction up to the full amount
financed."25
256. Id. § 2.407(2).
257. Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule § 433.1, 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973).
258. Id.
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Note that this an indirect method of attempting to force related
creditors firstly, to contractually agree in their consumer loan con-
tract to finance the purchase of a consumer sale or service, and sec-
ondly, to permit the assertion of claims and defenses arising out of
the separate but related sale. The FTC, one must note, does not
have any jurisdiction over banks to compel directly that which this
rule attempts to coerce indirectly. This indirect regulation raises
substantial problems as to the legality of the intrusion into the regu-
latory jurisdiction of other agencies, such as the Comptroller of
Currency and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. It also cannot
help but cause sellers and financers to be apprehensive and uncer-
tain about the "nature" of their relationships with merchants. This
in part is due to the criteria set out in the proposed revised rule for
a determination of "related creditor status." Nine situations are cov-
ered as follows:
Related creditor. Any person, partnership, corporation or association
which is engaged in making loans to consumers to enable payment to be
made for consumer goods or services and which either participates in or
directly connected with the consumer transaction. Without limiting the
scope of the immediately preceding language, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that a creditor is a related creditor under any one of the fol-
lowing circumstances:
(1) the creditor is a person related by blood or marriage to the seller
or to the seller's spouse.
(2) the creditor prepared, supplied or furnished the seller with the
forms or documents used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(3) the seller prepared, supplied or furnished the creditor with the
forms or documents used to evidence or secure the consumer loan.
(4) the creditor is directly or indirectly controlled by, under common
control of, or is otherwise affiliated with the seller.
(5) the creditor and the seller are engaged in a joint venture to pro-
duce consumer obligations payable either directly or by transfer to the
creditor.
(6) the creditor directly or indirectly pays the seller any considera-
tion for the referral of consumer borrowers.
(7) the seller guaranteed the consumer loan or otherwise assumed
the risk of loss by the creditor upon the loan.
(8) the creditor made five or more loans within a one-year period
the proceeds of which were used in transactions with the same seller
following referral of the consumer to the creditor by the seller.
(9) the creditor knew or had reason to know that the loan proceeds
would be used in whole or in substantial part to pay the seller for an
obligation of the consumer, and the creditor had notice that the seller
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
failed or refused to perform contracts with consumers, or failed to remedy
complaints within a reasonable time. 259
The proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule must be considered
one of the most potentially perplexing credit regulations coming from
the Washington bureaucrats in quite a while. Realistically, however,
it may well be designed to spur state enactment of interlocking sale-
loan legislation. New York, for example, has recently enacted an
interlocking statute.2 °  For an excellent discussion of the New
York statute as well as other state and federal proposals dealing
with interlocking sales and loans, one should consult the writings of
Professor Littlefield, who without question, is the nation's most
eminent expert on the topic. 26'
In conclusion it is sufficient to say that Illinois lags far behind
much of the country in limiting HDC, waiver-of-defense, interlock-
ing cut-off practices. In fact, the Illinois Appellate Court specifically
validated waiver cut-offs in 1965.62 The proliferation of health
clubs, dance schools, home improvement firms, correspondence and
karate schools, continues to induce unsuspecting citizens into the
web of retail installment paper. In a short time, these citizens will
learn something they did not bargain for-they will learn of the com-
mercial doctrine of holder-in-due-course. It is a lesson they likely
will remember for a long time.
PART SEVEN
SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LAW
This final segment, briefly discusses confessions of judgment, re-
cent amendments to the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, the Federal
Consumer Product Safety Act and the Illinois Retail Installment
Sales Act.
Confessions of judgment begins with the case of Babb v. John-
son,26 decided by the Illinois Third District Appellate Court in May,
259. Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule § 433.1(h), 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973).
260. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 253-254 (McKinney 1972).
261. Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and
Credit Card Transactions-Recent Statutes, Policies and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 471.
262. First Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780
(1965).
263. 5 Ill. App. 3d 191, 282 N.E.2d 266 (1972).
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1972, upholding a confession clause in a lease for a tavern. The
court cited as authority the United States Supreme Court case of
D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co.,264 and Swarb v. Lennox.26 5
Similarly, in Ives v. May, 2 6 the Illinois appellate court also rejected
the argument that such confessions were per se unconstitutional.
Only in the 1972 federal district court opinion of Scott v. Dan-
aher,267 was a successful attack made on Illinois confession practice.
There, a statutory three-judge federal court panel held that the Ill-
inois garnishment statute, which permits judgment by confession,
violates the fourteenth amendment. 26 8  This case is discussed by
Attorney Leonard M. Cohen in a recent article appearing in the
Illinois Bar Journal.2 69
Attention now turns to recent Illinois legislation. Two bills of
the first regular session of the Seventy-Eighth Illinois General As-
sembly warrant mentioning, both involving amendments to the Illi-
nois Consumer Fraud Act.270
Senate Bill 1152271 proposes to amend paragraph 262B2 72 of the
264. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
265. 405 U.S. 191 (1972). See also Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D.
Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
266. 5 Il1. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (1972).
267. 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
268. Id.
269. Cohen, Current Decisions on Confession of Judgment, 61 ILL. B.J. 603
(1973).
270. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 261 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
271. S.B. 1152, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) [hereinafter referred to as S.B.
1152]. This Bill was introduced May 10, 1973, by Senators Nimrod, Harris,
Graham and Howard K. Mohr. As of July 2, 1973, the Bill had not yet passed
("exempt from Senate tabling motion"). See 22 LEG. SYNOPSIS AND DIO. vol. 1,
78th Ill. Gen. Assembly 550 (1973).
272. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/, § 262B (Smith-Hurd 1971):
Where merchandise having a cash sales price of $25 or more is sold or
contracted to be sold whether under a single contract or under multiple
contracts, to a consumer as a result of or in connection with a salesman's
direct contact with or call on the consumer at his residence (without the
consumer's soliciting the contact or call), that consumer may avoid the
contract or sale by notifying the seller within 3 full business days follow-
ing that day on which the contract was signed or the sale was made and
by returning to the seller, in its original condition, any merchandise deliv-
ered to him under the contract or sale. At the time the sale is made or the
contract signed, the salesman shall furnish the buyer with a written re-
ceipt or contract a "Notice of Cancellation" informing the consumer of his
right to cancel the contract or sale as herein provided. The Notice of
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Consumer Fraud Act which provides, in effect, that a sale to a con-
sumer at his residence is subject to cancellation by the buyer within
three full business days following the day on which the contract was
signed. The first change eliminates the following provision: "with-
out the consumer's soliciting the contract or call . . . " which:af-
fords the consumer protection although he may have invited the
salesman to his residence. Second, one may "cancel" rather than
"avoid" a contract and references to "buyer" have been amended to
read "consumer", thereby making "seller" and "consumer" the
only terms referring to the contracting parties. Third, the Notice of
Cancellation has been amended so that its purpose is to inform
"the consumer of his right to cancel the contract or sale as herein
provided." Next, the three day period has been amended so that it
"does not commence until the seller furnishes the consumer the No-
tice of Cancellation and the address or phone number at which
such notice to the seller Can be given." Finally, an additional clause
has been inserted which prohibits the seller "(from failing) to com-
ply with any of the provisions of this section ..
Illinois is just one of several states that provides for the rectifica-
tion of abuses arising out of home sales.2 73  Regulation Z of the Fed-
eral Truth in Lending Act2 74 has a similar provision. While the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act deals with "any" merchandise having
a value of twnety-five dollars or more, the federal provision applies
only to a credit transaction involving a security interest is held in
real property which is the consumer's principal residence.2 75
Cancellation may be sent by the consumer to the seller to cancel the con-
tract. The 3 day period provided for in this Section does not commence
until the seller furnishes the consumer the Notice of Cancellation and
the address or phone number at which such notice to the seller can be given.
If those conditions are met, the seller must return to the consumer the
full amount or any payment made or consideration given under the contract
or for the merchandise. It is unlawful practice within the meaning of
this Act for a seller to fail to comply with any of the provisions of this
Section or to refuse to make full refund as required by this Section or for a
seller to use any undue influence, coercion, misrepresentation or any other
willful act or representation to interfere with the consumer's exercise of his
rights under this Section.
See S.B. 1152.
273. See, e.g., Comment, Home Solicitation Sales-The Legislative Response to a
"Cooling Off' Period, 24 S.C.L. REv. 880, 885 nn. 32-35 (1972) (list of state
statutes affording protection).
274. SEC Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1973).
275. The federal Regulation Z of the Truth-in-Lending Act is more inclusive
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House Bill 741,270 passed June 22, 1973, adds section 262M
to the Consumer Fraud Act. This section requires persons adver-
tising factory authorized services to supply proof by manufacturer
certification that such persons and services are factory authorized.
This change, however, represents but a small inroad into the field of
automobile repair legislation.
Numerous bills dealing with automobile repairs have failed to pass
the Illinois House or Senate. 77 Consumer fraud and deceptive prac-
tices in automobile repair presents a serious problem to consumers;
faulty and negligent repairs and inflated charges are but a few of the
abuses that frequently arise. 7 s Corrective legislation is overdue.
A comprehensive administrative program establishing, among other
than any comparable Illinois provision. For example, unlike the Illinois provision,
the federal provision provides for a waiver of right of rescission and exceptions to
the general rule. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WHAT You
OUGHT TO KNOW ABOUT FEDERAL RESERVE REGULATION Z, TRUTH-IN-LENDING:
CONSUMER CREDIT COST DISCLOSURE (1969).
276. H.B. 741, 78th Il. Gen. Assembly (1973). This Bill was introduced by
Hoffman, North, Wolf, Pappas, Fleck, McCourt, Waddell, Springer, Sevcik, Griesh-
eimer and Rose.
277. See, e.g., H.B. 37, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973), entitled "The Motor
Vehicle Repair Act" provided in part that repairmen before beginning any repair
work submit a good faith written estimate of the cost of such repair and after
completion a written itemized list of services made, repairs performed and parts and
costs of each. The repairman is to tender the worn or defective parts removed.
The Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General would
administer the Act and impose penalties for violations. It was recommended
that the Bill not pass and thus was tabled on May 11, 1973. See H.B. 1297, 22
LEG. SYNOPSIS AND DIG. vol. II, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly 39 (1973). The Bill
Requires 3 month or 3,000 mile guarantee (whichever first occurs) to be
given by persons selling automobile parts. Requires similar guarantee to
be given for labor by persons performing labor for charge on automobiles
and imposes liability on such persons for damages proximately caused by
faulty labor.
H.B. 1391 "[m]akes void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable any
contract or agreement for any repair of a motor vehicle in which an automotive re-
pair dealer exculpates himself from liability for injury to persons caused by his negli-
gent repair." See 22 LEG. SYNOPSIS AND DIG. vol. II, 78th IlL. Gen. Assembly 719
(1973). These two Bills were also tabled.
278. See, e.g., Cuming, Consumer Protection-The Itinerant Seller, 32 SASK. L.
REV. 113 (1967); Willier, Protection Installment Buyers Didn't Get, 2 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 287 (1961); Comment, The Need for Protection of the Consumer of
Services, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 173 (1969); Note, Regulation of Automotive Repair
Services, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1010 (1971); Note, You Can Trust Your Car to the
Man Who Wears the Star-Or Can You?: The Use of Apparent Authority to Es-
tablish a Principal's Tort Liability, 33 U. PITt. L. REv. 257 (1971).
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things, licensing requirements for mechanics and repairmen, admin-
istrative bodies and agencies to manage an effective program and pos-
sibly an administrative board 279 to adjudicate repair cases is needed.
Illinois legislation has yet to scratch the surface in this regard.28 °
Some states, however, have taken progressive steps toward amelio-
rating this situation.
California, for example, has enacted an Automobile Repair Act
providing for the administration and licensing of automotive repair
dealers.28' Several articles of the California Act in particular are
worth noting. First, article two establishes a Bureau of Automotive
Repair under the supervision and control of the Director of the De-
partment of Consumer Affairs; the director investigates violations in-
cluding complaints from the public against dealers and mechanics.
A Bureau Chief is responsible for the enforcement and administra-
tion of the Act. A record of licensed automotive repair dealers
(ARDs) is available to consumers upon request. A Bureau Board
of nine members appointed by the Governor, five from the public
and four from the automotive repair industry, meets at least twice
a year to confer, advise and make any necessary recommendations
to the bureau. Next, article three requires ARDs to be registered.
All work is to be recorded on an invoice which must describe the
service work done and parts supplied. ARDs are to furnish a writ-
ten estimate price of the parts and labor and cannot charge in ex-
cess of the estimate. A superior court can issue an injunction or
other appropriate orders to restrain conduct which violates the act.
Articles five through eight have additional provisions for the li-
censing and regulation of official lamp and brake adjusting sta-
279. This may be a more convenient, economical and effective measure for the
consumer than filing complaints with the Fraud and Complaint Division of the
Illinois State's Attorney's Office or the Consumer Protection Division of the Attor-
ney General's Office would be. It would probably save time and expense involved
in litigating in the small claims court or circuit courts. In any event, effective con-
trol is needed over this sector of business.
280. Chicago's Municipal Code has a "Motor Vehicle Storage, Repair and Sales
Act" but it affords no consumer protection for faulty or negligent repair work.
Its primary concern is zoning-to insure that neighborhoods remain residential.
It deals with, among other things, health regulations, inspection, light and heating,
ventilation and even toilet facilities-its lack of sanctions or remedies for faulty
repairs makes the provision of little significance to the consumer. See, CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 156-1 et seq. (1973).
281. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9880 (West Supp. 1973).
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tions and motor vehicle pollution control device installation and in-
spection stations. Finally, article nine provides for a misdemeanor
penalty of a fine up to one thousand dollars and six months in jail.
This act is not a panacea for consumers. For instance, many so-
called "minor services customarily done by a gasoline service sta-
tion" '282 are excluded along with employees of ARDs; the bureau
board is merely advisory; and the act requires registration but not li-
censing of ARDs.
Connecticut also has enacted a statutory scheme for regulating
automobile repairmen.283  Connecticut classifies repairmen into
two categories according to the services performed: a "repairer"
or "limited repairer." To qualify as a limited repairman an individ-
ual must meet one of several requirements: he must either be a
qualified mechanic, have a certificate of completion from an approved
service school, have been employed for three years by a licensed re-
pairer or have successfully passed a state examination.284 A re-
pairman must be licensed and he must receive a certificate approving
the location of his business.
There are also sections dealing with registration and special licens-
ing of automobiles owned or temporarily in his custody, loaned or
rented by a repairer. A repairman's license may be revoked or
suspended when, after a notice and hearing, it is determined that
there has been a violation of any provision in the article on licensing
or a false statement as to the condition of any motor vehicle repaired
has been given.285 The major shortcoming of the Connecticut Act
is that it gives no direct recourse to the consumer who is adversely
affected by a repairman's faulty or negligent work.
The point is, other states have already gone much further than
Illinois in attempting to regulate automotive repair practices for
the consumer's benefit.
Although space does not permit a thorough discussion, we must
briefly point to the enactment by Congress of the Consumer Product
Safety Act which went into effect on October 27, 1972.286 The Act
282. id. § 9880.1(f).
283. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-52 (1970).
284. Id. § 14-51.
285. Id. § 14-64.
286. Pub. L. No. 92-573 (October 27, 1972).
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is designed to (1) protect the public against unreasonable risks of
injury associated with consumer products, (2) to assist consumers
in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products, (3) to de-
velop uniform safety standards for consumer products and (4) to
promote research and investigation into causes and prevention of
product-related deaths, illnesses and injuries.2 87
To accomplish these purposes, the Act established a five-person
Consumer Product Safety Commission which has the power to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations for consumer products.2 8s The Act
affords persons injured by reason of any knowing violation of the
Act the right to recover damages. 89
One problem that will undoubtedly be litigated in the future is
the extent to which a manufacturer's showing of full compliance
with applicable Commission standards can be raised as a defense in
a product's liability suit. Certainly, one can see a number of briefs,
in the future being researched and written on that point.
The Act's full impact, of course, will not be felt until the Com-
mission promulgates product regulations and standards. Court chal-
lenges to these promulgations will likewise surely ensue.
There have been several recent cases decided interpreting and ap-
plying the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act.290  Of most signi-
ficance is Overland Bond and Investment Corp. v. Howard.29 1
This case and other significant decisions affecting consumer rights
in retail installment sales are thoroughly and insightfully discussed
by Professor Edward J. Benett elsewhere in this volume. 2
In the area of product liability, there also have been recent signif-
icant Illinois decisions, notably Meiher v. Brown,29' and Rios v.
287. Id. § 2(b).
288. Id. § 4(a).
289. Id. § 20(a)(1).
290. ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 1212, §§ 501 et seq. (1971). See, e.g., Anco Invest-
ment Corp. v. Spencer, 1 Ill. App. .3d 445, 275 N.E.2d 263 (1971), and discussion
of case in Benett, Sales, Survey of. Illinois Law, 1971-72, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 156,
170 (1972). t
291. 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972). .
292. Benett, Sales, Survey of Illinois Law, 1972-73, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 179
(1973).
293. 54 Il. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
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Niagara Machine Tool Works.2" 4 The Meiher case is magnificently
discussed and disected by my colleague Professor Richard Turking-
ton elsewhere in this volume.29 5 In Rios, the plaintiff was injured
while operating a punch press. The movable part of the press de-
scended on his hand when a safety device, added to the machine,
after its purchase from defendant, failed to work. Defendant argued
that the machine's lack of a safety device when sold to the plaintiff's
employer was not an unreasonably dangerous condition for which
the defendant might be held strictly liable.296  The appellate court
then made a potentially troublesome distinction: Where a machine
has a single function, and is unreasonably dangerous in performing
that single function, it is defective. On the contrary, the court added,
where the machine is multifunctional, "no duty should be imposed
upon the manufacturer to provide any safety devices before the ma-
chine leaves his control. 297
CONCLUSION
The past year has seen numerous developments in the law affect-
ing consumer rights and obligations. Certainly, caveat emptor is
becoming weathered, but is not yet an extinct concept.
So too, has there been an increase in public regulations in the
consumer product field, both as to consumer sales warranties, and
as to disclosure of credit terms in consumer transactions. All of
these events represent significant marketplace tampering which will
impinge upon consumer-creditor behavior in countless ways. Cer-
tainly, there will be more work for lawyers.
Yet, considering the basic notion of preserving the freedom of con-
tract--a notion which subsumes within it prohibiting what has be-
come established commercial practice, and making credit more easily
available rather than restricting it-the cost analysis appears to sug-
gest that poor people will not be significantly helped by the range of
recent developments. On the other hand, perhaps the greatest ad-
294. 12 Ii. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973).
295. Turkington, Torts, Survey of Illinois Law, 1972-73, 23 DEPAUL L. REv.
464 (1973).
296. 12 I1. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973).
297. Id. at 745, 299 N.E.2d at 91.
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vance in this past year has been the working of the Cook County
Pro Se Court. The writer sincerely hopes that the creation of small
claims forums spreads throughout the United States.
Consumer interests can best be served by the proliferation of ef-
fective consumer forums, as well as by the creative activities of con-
cemed courts and legislatures.
